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REMEDIAL PAYMENTS IN AGENCY ENFORCEMENT
Seema Kakade*
During the Obama Administration, the government settled many enforcement cases in-
volving alleged violations of the nation’s federal statutes. The settlements have several re-
quirements, including that the defendants pay money for beneficial projects to mitigate or offset
harm directly or indirectly caused by defendants’ actions. For example, the government settled
an environmental enforcement case against Volkswagen that included payments for environ-
mental projects, and a mortgage enforcement case against Bank of America that included pay-
ments for housing education projects. These payments have spawned renewed criticism
amongst conservative groups who have long claimed that payments for projects are mechanisms
for agencies to get vulnerable defendant corporations to fund pet projects, outside of available
agency statutory authority and the Congressional budget appropriations process. This Article
examines payments for projects in agency settlements, using Clean Air Act enforcement as an
example, and argues for additional clarity and transparency surrounding the purpose of such
payments. The law most clearly allows for payments for projects in statutory enforcement cases
when they serve a clear remedial purpose. Yet payments for projects have often tried to achieve
multiple goals at the same time, including deterrence and compensation. As a result, it is
sometimes difficult to see the remedial purpose of payments for projects, particularly in a settle-
ment where the process of resolution is not as apparent as in litigation. A legislative solution
could provide for obvious legal authority for payments for projects. However, in the absence of
such a legislative fix, agencies should focus on better identification of harm earlier in the
enforcement process, and better articulation of the connection between harm and projects in the
settlement process. Payments for projects serve a key role in making the public whole from
statutory violations. Clarity and transparency on the purpose of projects can help alleviate the
concerns surrounding authority and appropriations, and ultimately strengthen the review of
projects by courts.
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INTRODUCTION
When a company violates the nation’s federal environmental laws, there
should be a remedy. A remedy, however, is rarely one thing. Instead, resolu-
tions for environmental enforcement cases involve multiple remedies with mul-
tiple goals. Remedies should address the compliance problem by providing
prospective injunctive relief. Remedies should also impose civil penalties to de-
ter future misconduct and punish defendants. However, neither prospective in-
junctive relief nor civil penalties provide a complete remedy for all violations
because they do not undo the existing harm. The public remains worse off than
they would be without the violation.
One part of a remedy should account for the impact of the violation on the
public. In the environmental context, if a company violated the law by failing to
install a filter when it upgraded its manufacturing facility, a remedy for such
violation should not only consist of installing the filter and paying a civil pen-
alty. The remedy should also require the company to address the impact to the
environment from operating without the requisite filter. If a company violated
the law by installing a computer chip in its cars that automatically turns off
filters when the cars are driving, a remedy should not only consist of removing
the cars and paying a civil penalty. The remedy should also require the company
to address the impact to the environment from the cars that have already been
on the road driving without filters. Stopping the violation and paying a penalty
are forward-looking remedies that alone do not actually help undo the harm to
the public from the past.
Plaintiffs in enforcement cases—both government and citizen groups—
have sought remedies requiring that defendants pay for projects that mitigate or
offset past harm. Cases involving regulatory enforcement are different from
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other kinds of cases. Unlike tort cases, there is not always an identifiable victim
to compensate for the loss. Thus, in cases involving enforcement of environ-
mental statutes, it is difficult to figure out how to remedy for past harm from a
violation. In the environmental context, the harm is to the public at large, in-
cluding the overall health of communities and natural resources. Payments for
projects provide the mechanism to address past harm in environmental enforce-
ment cases. The idea is that if a defendant cannot remove pollution emitted in
excess of standards, it should pay to offset or mitigate against it. The payment
then should go towards projects that reduce future additional pollution beyond
what would otherwise occur, or help restore communities and resources im-
pacted by the excess pollution.
Yet payments for projects as remedies in regulatory enforcement cases have
been controversial for decades. The controversy is particularly acute in settle-
ment of government enforcement cases. Environmental interests criticize agen-
cies as selecting payments for projects in an ad hoc manner,1 and devaluing or
excluding the participation of community members.2 They also argue that
agencies fail to prioritize the right kinds of projects, such as those that could
affect vulnerable populations.3 Conservative groups and defendants contest the
existence of a causal link between the violation and the alleged harm, and be-
tween the alleged harm and the projects.4 They also assert that such payments
belong in the U.S. Treasury for Congress to appropriate, rather than being left
to executive branch agencies to decide what projects to fund.5 In addition,
scholars have expressed concern that for settlements in particular, payments for
projects may allow agencies to use litigation as a way to impose regulatory re-
quirements on companies without the benefit of notice and comment rulemak-
ing processes.6
1. Charles H.W. Foster & Frances H. Foster, The Massachusetts Environmental Trust, 41
ECOLOGY L.Q. 751, 759–60 (2014).
2. See Steven Bonnoris et al., Environmental Enforcement in the Fifty States: The Promise and
Pitfalls of Supplemental Environmental Projects, 11 HASTINGS WEST-NORTHWEST J.
ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 185, 188 (2005) (“This report argues against leaving the negotiation of
SEPs to the unfettered discretion of enforcement personnel, because of the lack of trans-
parency and equity to both violators and affected communities.”); Patrice Simms, Leveraging
Supplemental Environmental Projects: Towards an Integrated Strategy for Empowering Envi-
ronmental Justice Communities, 47 ENVTL. L. REP. 10,511, 10,525 (2017).
3. See Simms, supra note 2, at 10,523–25.
4. See Stop Settlement Slush Funds Act of 2016: Hearing on H.R. 5063 Before the Subcomm. on
Regulatory Reform, Commercial and Antitrust Law of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 114th
Cong. (2016) (statement of Paul Figley, Prof., Associate Director of Legal Rhetoric at
American University Washington College of Law); WILLIAM YEATMAN, COMPETITIVE
ENTER. INST., ONPOINT NO. 232, ENDING THE EPA’S BILLION-DOLLAR GREEN EN-
ERGY RIP-OFF 4–5 (2017).
5. See YEATMAN, supra note 4, at 1. R
6. See Andrew P. Morriss, Bruce Yandle, & Andrew Dorchak, Choosing How to Regulate, 29
HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 179, 240–43 (2005).
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Payments for projects have recently garnered renewed attention in the
Trump Administration. Guidance issued by the U.S. Department of Justice
(“DOJ”) in 2017, 2018, and 2019 now limit the ability of federal agencies to
seek payments for projects in enforcement case settlements.7 The guidance ap-
plies not only to federal environmental enforcement but to other areas of regu-
latory enforcement as well.8 Agencies have always faced some limits, but the
new limits are arguably more stringent, and as a result they revive the long
standing conversation and controversy surrounding legal authority, congres-
sional appropriations, and transparency, in settlement.9 In addition, state agen-
cies and citizen-group plaintiffs that may be increasing enforcement activity
under enforcement statutes will need to sort out how to handle remedies for
past harm.10 Therefore, payments for projects are a particularly timely topic.
Using environmental enforcement as an example, this Article makes sev-
eral points regarding payments for projects in regulatory enforcement actions. It
asserts that many environmental statutes, such as the Clean Air Act (“CAA”),
provide authority for both civil penalties and injunctive relief. It asserts further
that the government has a strong policy rationale and legal basis for pursuing
payments for projects under both authorities. It provides analysis of the benefits
and disadvantages of using each authority, reflecting the fact that over time,
payments for projects have gone through a kind of conflation with traditionally
recognized remedies, such as compensation, deterrence, and restitution. It
makes some suggestions for legislative changes, but focuses primarily on how to
solidify the remedial purpose and use of such payments within the existing au-
thorities and settlement processes. To that end, it promotes the use of scientific
research, experts, and modeling of excess pollution early in the enforcement
process, as a way to help identify harm from violations and inform project op-
tions. In addition, it asserts that a better explanation in settlement documents
of how payments for projects connect to harm can provide transparency and
clarity to defendants, the public, and the courts. Specifically, it argues that
agencies should more effectively utilize the motion to enter a judicial decree,
public comment, and court approval processes. Finally, it proposes inter-agency
dialogue among multiple enforcement agencies working with similar statutes
regarding how to explain remedial purpose in settlement.
7. Memorandum from Jeff Sessions, U.S. Att’y Gen., to All Component Heads and U.S.
Att’ys, Prohibition on Settlement Payments to Third Parties (June 5, 2017) [hereinafter
DOJ 2017 Guidance], https://perma.cc/4MS6-AHYK; Memorandum from Jeffrey H.
Wood, Acting Assistant Att’y Gen., to ENRD Deputy Assistant Att’ys Gen. and Section
Chiefs, Settlement Payments to Third Parties in ENRD Cases (Jan. 9, 2018) [hereinafter
DOJ 2018 Guidance], https://perma.cc/4PLY-S5L6.
8. See DOJ 2017 Guidance, supra note 7; DOJ 2018 Guidance, supra note 7.
9. See DOJ 2017 Guidance, supra note 7; DOJ 2018 Guidance, supra note 7.
10. Stephen Cohen, Can State Environmental Agencies Fill in for a Failing EPA?, HUFFINGTON
POST (Apr. 10, 2017), https://perma.cc/4PXP-KD25.
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In making its points, this Article focuses on the CAA and proceeds in four
parts. Part I provides background and context for CAA enforcement generally,
including the role of settlement. Part II describes the evolution of payments for
projects in CAA enforcement cases as part of penalty and injunctive relief stat-
utory authorities. Part III analyzes the purpose of payments for projects in
CAA enforcement cases within the context of traditional remedies available at
law and in equity. Part IV describes the current controversy surrounding pay-
ments for projects, specifically new guidance issued in 2017, 2018, and 2019 by
the Trump Administration, which limited agencies’ ability to seek such pay-
ments in CAA enforcement case resolutions. Part V explains why, in the ab-
sence of a larger legislative fix, it is important to identify the purpose and use of
payments for projects, and makes suggestions for how to do so in in the en-
forcement investigation and settlement approval process.
I. BACKGROUND AND CONTEXT
This Part provides background and context on the issues that are central to
the confusion and controversy over payments for projects in regulatory enforce-
ment cases. Specifically, this Part discusses why it may be difficult to under-
stand the need for such payments, the divergent liability structures of
environmental statutes, and the uncertainty that exists in settlement.
A. Harm to the Public
We all need and want a clean environment. We need clean air to breathe,
water to drink, and land to build on. In addition, we all desire clean air, water,
and land. We value scenic vistas unburdened by smog and we enjoy recreational
pursuits in natural areas with healthy soils and waters. A clean environment
influences our lives every minute of every day.
Pollution, however, is complicated. It is often invisible. It does not stay in
one spot. Instead, pollution travels, disperses, and sometimes evaporates. Some
pollutants regulated by the CAA are hazardous air pollutants (“HAPs”), such as
mercury, lead, and asbestos, which have impacts near an emitting facility.11
Other air pollutants, like some of the National Ambient Air Quality Standards
(“NAAQS”) pollutants, can travel long distances.12 As a result, it is difficult to
keep track of where pollution goes, and what it affects.
This difficulty of assessing the exact impact of pollution often feeds into
the argument that there is no impact, and that therefore a remedy is not neces-
sary when companies violate standards. Yet pollution has a significant impact
on public health and natural resources. A variety of air pollutants pose multiple
11. See Hazardous Air Pollutants: Sources and Exposure, EPA, https://perma.cc/6LLD-CGWV.
12. See Ground-Level Ozone Basics, EPA, https://perma.cc/DN3Z-L52C.
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kinds of harm to the public. For instance, nitrogen oxides (“NOx”), the primary
NAAQS pollutants at issue in the Volkswagen settlement, react with other
chemicals in the air to form new pollutants like particulate matter (“PM”) and
ground-level ozone, which often cause harm farther away from the source.
Some harm is to public health, some to natural resources, and some to recrea-
tional opportunities. PM and ozone, for example, both have tremendous im-
pacts on respiratory and cardiovascular functioning, and particularly affect
children, the elderly, and those with pre-existing conditions, like asthma.13
Acidic pollutants like NOx mix with rain in the atmosphere and return to the
earth’s surface as acid rain.14 Scientists for many years have identified acid rain
as a significant contributor to damaged forests and waterbodies. Furthermore,
smog, which is a mix of NOx and volatile organic compounds (“VOCs”),
reduces visibility in places of recreation.15
That is not to say that it is easy to attribute harm to public health and
natural resources in individual enforcement actions. Sometimes the link is clear,
such as when a community or neighborhood experiences health symptoms im-
mediately after an illegal release of air pollution. Sometimes violators emit huge
amounts of pollution that dwarf other sources in the area. However, it can be
difficult in some cases to pinpoint one violating source as a contributor. The
amount of pollution from one violating source may not be large, and may be
swallowed by other sources, particularly in urban areas. These circumstances
can raise proximate cause issues, because it is difficult to demonstrate that the
harm sufficiently connects to the violation.
Because harm from a violation is not always traceable or quantifiable, rem-
edies involve payments for projects to mitigate or offset the general harm asso-
ciated with the violation. Defendants have paid money for projects to extract
invasive species and restore native species in forests damaged by acid rain,16 and
to install electric charging stations in heavily trafficked corridors.17 Sometimes
the defendant company completes the projects on its own. Sometimes the de-
fendant company outsources the work to third-party organizations for imple-
mentation. For example, when defendants have paid to swap out old wood-
burning stoves in residential homes with newer, cleaner stoves, they have used
13. Health and Environmental Effects of Particulate Matter (PM), EPA, https://perma.cc/7JEE-
9DLQ; Health Effects of Ozone and Particle Pollution, AM. LUNG ASS’N, https://perma.cc/
KAQ9-TRBG.
14. See Effects of Acid Rain, EPA, https://perma.cc/NW36-VJQK.
15. See Ground-Level Ozone Basics, supra note 12. R
16. See, e.g., Consent Decree at app. 6–7, United States v. N. Ind. Pub. Serv. Co., No. 2:11-cv-
00016-JVB-APR (N.D. Ind. July 22, 2011), https://perma.cc/74VN-A5H5.
17. See, e.g., id. at app. 9 (allowing NIPSCO to meet its emission reductions under the consent
decree by investing in electric vehicle infrastructure); Melissa Roberts, Release: NIPSCO Un-
veils Electric Vehicle Program, ENERGY SYS. NETWORK (Apr. 5, 2012), https://perma.cc/
4UUW-ZTMY (“This program is being offered as part of a Supplemental Environmental
Project under the NIPSCO . . . settlement.”).
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organizations such as the American Lung Association.18 Defendants have also
agreed to spend money to achieve “beyond compliance” projects at their own
facilities.19 For example, a defendant company may agree to meet a more strin-
gent emissions limit at another factory located within the same airshed. In all
such payments, the goal is to reduce pollution in the future beyond what would
otherwise occur as a way to mitigate or offset the excess pollution from the past.
Such payments for projects are the key method of addressing the overall health
and natural resource impact which results from a defendant’s violation.
B. Federal Environmental Statutes
The controversy over payments for projects has also surrounded whether,
when, and how existing environmental statutory frameworks allow for such
payments. Enforcement necessarily begins with allegations of wrongdoing. Yet
not all environmental statutes have the same structure for imposing liability.
Some environmental statutes, like the Comprehensive Environmental Re-
sponse, Compensation, and Liability Act (“CERCLA”), provide that poten-
tially responsible parties are liable for the cleanup of sites where there has
already been a release of a listed hazardous substance onto surface or water, and
for the restoration of any resulting damaged natural resources.20 Other statutes,
like the CAA, or the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (“RCRA”),
however, are forward-looking in nature. These statutes seek to protect the pub-
lic from ongoing or future pollution through a “command and control” ap-
proach whereby a government body either requires or prohibits actions by
regulated entities.21 A typical command-and-control approach to environmental
law does not focus on imposing liability for remediation and restoration of pol-
lution that has already occurred. Instead, the approach involves setting allowa-
18. See, e.g., Implementing Wood-Burning Change out Campaigns and Examples of Programs, EPA,
https://perma.cc/D7AE-254M (“The Northeast American Lung Association conducted a
tri-state changeout program as a result of a settlement between EPA and Dominion Energy
for violations of the Clean Air Act.”).
19. See, e.g., Morriss et al., supra note 6, at 241 (noting that in several defeat device case settle- R
ments in the late 1990s, defendants agreed to “pull ahead” requirements which would require
defendants to meet upcoming regulations at an earlier date); Essroc Cement Company Settle-
ment, EPA, https://perma.cc/2Q3S-M5ZL (“This settlement also requires Essroc to spend
$745,000 in mitigation dollars to replace old engines in several off-road vehicles at its plant
sites.”).
20. Any potentially responsible party (“PRP”) associated with a facility from which there is a
release or a threatened release of a hazardous substance, “shall be liable for . . . [any] neces-
sary costs of response incurred by any other person consistent with the national contingency
plan.” 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4)(B) (2018).
21. See, e.g., Expert Report of Michael B. Gerrard at 8, La. Generating LLC v. Ill. Union Ins.
Co., No. 3:10-cv-00516, 2015 WL 10552014 (M.D. La. Feb. 22, 2015).
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ble pollution standards that regulated entities must meet in the future, through
operational and technological requirements.
Because the liability structures vary among environmental statutes, so do
the enforcement provisions. Statutes like CERCLA that are inherently back-
ward-looking explicitly provide for environmental cleanup and restoration
projects from any liable party.22 Thus, the entire CERCLA process contem-
plates a remedial and restorative purpose of making the environment and public
whole.23 Statutes like the CAA, however, allow for two explicit remedies
against regulated entities for failing to comply with standards and regulations.24
First, the CAA allows for civil penalties as legal remedies.25 Second, the CAA
allows for the restraint of violations, typically through injunctive relief, as equi-
table remedies.26 For some violations, the CAA also allows for “any other ap-
propriate relief.”27 Payments for projects have been part of both civil penalty
and injunctive relief in CAA enforcement cases, but not without questions and
concerns from legal scholars and practitioners.
A central concern over CAA authority for payments for projects, as part of
civil penalty, has been whether agencies are inappropriately circumventing
Congress’ power of the purse.28 Pursuant to federal appropriations law, all civil
penalty monies received by the government, including those from agency en-
forcement actions, belong in the U.S. Treasury.29 In addition, most environ-
mental statutes require that civil penalty monies received by citizen-group
plaintiffs in enforcement also go to the U.S. Treasury.30 Thus, payments for
projects as components of civil penalty authority in forward-looking statutes
like the CAA have raised significant concerns surrounding federal appropria-
tions law. As described further in Part II of this Article, opponents of payments
for projects argue that such payments belong in the U.S. Treasury for Congress
22. See id.
23. Id. at 8–9.
24. The enforcement provisions of the CAA also allow for administrative enforcement, but this
Article focuses on judicial enforcement of the CAA involving the federal government as
plaintiffs, since that is the source of the recent guidance by the federal government limiting
payments for projects.
25. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7413(b), 7524(a) 2018.
26. Id. §§ 7431(b), 7523(a).
27. Id. § 7413(b).
28. Todd David Peterson, Protecting the Appropriations Power: Why Congress Should Care About
Settlements at the Department of Justice, 2009 BYU L. REV. 327, 351–52.
29. Id. at 329; see also 31 U.S.C. § 3302(b) (2018).
30. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 7604(a) (2018). But note that Congress added, as part of the 1990
CAA amendments, a provision allowing that a certain amount of civil penalty money re-
ceived by citizen groups in enforcement cases could bypass the U.S. Treasury and instead go
to EPA to “finance air compliance and enforcement activities.” Pub. L. No. 101-549,
§ 707(b), 104 Stat. 2399, 2682 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 7604).
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to appropriate, rather than on projects selected by agency officials and defend-
ants in settlement negotiations.
Furthermore, it is not always clear which authorities allow courts to order
monetary remedies. On one hand, monetary remedies are typically legal in na-
ture; that is, such remedies represent a penalty.31 Yet such monetary remedies
can also represent a way to address damage caused to the harmed parties by the
defendant’s actions, and in such instances, the monetary remedy is equitable,
and comes in the form of an injunction.32 Injunctions are typically requirements
to act or refrain from acting.33 Judges typically look at several factors in deciding
whether to grant injunctive relief, including whether there is irreparable injury,
whether remedies available at law—monetary damages—are inadequate to
compensate for that injury, and whether a balance of the hardships warrants a
remedy in equity.34 The question has been whether payments for specific
projects are more like a penalty or more like an injunction.
C. CAA Enforcement Process
The role of settlement has further complicated payments for projects in
CAA enforcement cases. In settlement of CAA enforcement actions, the gov-
ernment plaintiffs and defendant regulated entity agree to resolve alleged viola-
tions. There has been no proof of harm from the violation—merely an
allegation of harm. Thus, negotiators may resolve allegations of harm in a vac-
uum, with little information about the amount of excess emissions from the
source and about where those excess emissions traveled. Such information typi-
cally comes later in the enforcement process, in civil discovery.
Despite not knowing the exact amount of harm connected to a defendant’s
alleged violation, settlements often include payments for projects to remedy
such harm. Critics of payments for projects and some legal scholars argue that
such payments are simply mechanisms for the executive branch to extract reme-
dies in negotiations that fit general policy goals.35 They argue that there is enor-
mous pressure on defendants to simply agree to such payments and settle
cases.36 However, proponents for such payments and other legal scholars have
31. United States v. Ameren, 372 F. Supp. 3d 868, 875 (E.D. Mo. 2019) (“Ameren argues that
emissions reductions at Labadie would represent a penalty, and therefore a legal remedy.”).
32. Id. at 876; see also United States v. Westvaco, No. MJG-00-2602, 2015 WL 10323214 (D.
Md. Feb. 26, 2015); United States v. Cinergy Corp., 582 F. Supp. 2d 1055, 1061 (S.D. Ind.
2008).
33. See Amanda Frost, In Defense of Nationwide Injunctions, 93 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1065, 1070
(2018).
34. See, e.g., eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, LLC, 547 U.S. 388, 391 (2006).
35. Michael Patrick Wilt, Evaluating Consumer Relief Payments in Recent Bank Settlement Agree-
ments, 17 J. BUS. & SEC. L. 253, 284–85 (2017).
36. See Jerry W. Markham, Regulating the “Too Big to Jail” Financial Institutions, 83 BROOK. L.
REV. 517, 568 (2018) (“Why do the banks so readily accede to these settlement demands?
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long recognized the benefits of settlement in resolving disputes.37 Settlement is
often better for litigating parties. Settlement is faster than proceeding to trial,
saves resources, and allows parties to better control outcomes.38 Settlement can
also produce positive results for the public, particularly on environmental and
public health protection.39 Quicker resolutions force sources to come back into
compliance sooner.40 Lastly, settlement allows agency resources to spend time
investigating and developing cases on new violations.41 Regardless of the nor-
mative considerations, settlement is a common way to resolve environmental
enforcement matters. Environmental enforcement involves a multi-step
process.42
Federal environmental enforcement actions begin with an investigation of
a potential violation, often with sources that are the subject of national enforce-
ment initiatives (“NEI”).43 The CAA authorizes EPA to collect information,
inspect facilities, and require monitoring for the purposes of determining
whether a violation has occurred.44 The next step is the issuance of a notice of
violation, which depending on the violation might be a required step under the
CAA before commencing an action.45 Finally, plaintiffs will file a judicial com-
plaint, starting the process of civil discovery leading to trial.46 CAA enforce-
ment cases have settled as early as the investigation stage and as late as the
Senior executives at the large banks want to avoid career-ending indictments, years of litiga-
tion, and incarceration if charged and convicted. The large banks also face the loss of their
franchise—through the revocation of their charters—if they are actually convicted of crimes,
as was the case for Arthur Andersen. A settlement avoids those problems.”); Wilt, supra note
35, at 258 (“Settlement pressure on the financial institutions is intense.”). R
37. See, e.g., Courtney R. McVean & Justin Pidot, Environmental Settlements and Administrative
Law, 39 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 191, 194–96 (2015).
38. See Marc Galanter & Mia Cahill, Most Cases Settle: Judicial Promotion and Regulation of
Settlements, 46 STAN. L. REV. 1339, 1353 (1994) (“Settlements [offer] . . . greater party
participation and control, [and have] the possibility of individualizing outcomes to suit the
needs of the parties.”); Robert Percival, The Bounds of Consent: Consent Decrees, Settlements
and Federal Environmental Policymaking, 1987 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 327, 330 (describing dis-
tinct advantages of settlement, including efficiency).
39. See, e.g., United States v. Georgia-Pacific Corp., 960 F. Supp. 298, 299 (N.D. Ga. 1996)
(“[T]he Court recognizes the benefits of an early settlement, in particular the environmental
benefits that will accrue from G–P’s immediate implementation of the injunctive measures
contained in the Decree . . . .”).
40. Id.
41. Percival, supra note 38, at 329–30. R
42. John C. Cruden & Bruce S. Gelber, Federal Civil Environmental Enforcement: Process, Actors,
and Trends, 18 NAT. RESOURCES & ENV’T 10, 10 (2004).
43. The Trump Administration renamed NEIs “national compliance initiatives.” See National
Compliance Initiatives, EPA, https://perma.cc/DZA7-CRKB.
44. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7414(a), 7542 (2018).
45. See, e.g., id. § 7413(a).
46. See Cruden & Gelber, supra note 42, at 14 (“Once a case is filed, government counsel focus R
first on meeting their initial obligations under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and any
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beginning of trial.47 Therefore, what happens in the settlement process is
important.
While courts have certainly addressed authority for payments for projects
in adjudicated orders post-trial, a much larger number of courts have sanc-
tioned payments for projects through settlement approval.48 Indeed, the vast
majority of enforcement cases settle.49 Judicial enforcement cases memorialize
settlements through consent decrees, a negotiated agreement that a court enters
as a judgment.50 Before a court approves a settlement it will evaluate the settle-
ment as a proposal, usually upon motion to enter a proposed consent decree.
Courts evaluate a proposed consent decree based on whether it is “fundamen-
tally fair, adequate, reasonable, and in the public interest.”51 DOJ regulations
require that department lawyers provide an opportunity to persons not named
as parties to an action to comment on a proposed consent decree in environ-
mental enforcement matters.52 Sometimes courts require hearings on motions
to enter, particularly if there has been significant public comment.
The concern with settlement is that agencies and defendants negotiate the
terms of the consent decree—such as inclusion of payments for projects—be-
hind closed doors.53 As a result, the perception is that negotiators select projects
applicable local rules concerning mandatory disclosures, meeting with counsel, and organiz-
ing discovery.”).
47. For example, the 2013 CAA consent decree between the government and Ash Grove Ce-
ment Company was filed simultaneously with the filing of the judicial complaint. Consent
Decree at 1, United States v. Ash Grove Cement Co., No. 2:13-cv-0299 (D. Kan. June 19,
2013). The 2012 CAA consent decree between the government and Louisiana Generating,
however, was lodged after the government won a key summary judgment motion, just before
trial was set to begin. See United States v. La. Dep’t of Envtl. Quality, No. 09-100-JJB-CN
(M.D. La. Sept. 19, 2012); Consent Decree, La. DEQ, No. 09-100-JJB-DLD (M.D. La.
Mar. 5, 2013).
48. A look at EPA’s website for nationally significant CAA enforcement cases reveals that from
2007 to 2017, EPA settled about seventy CAA violations through judicial consent decrees,
and about forty involved payments for projects as components of injunctive relief. This does
not even include the number that involved payments as components of civil penalty. See Civil
Cases and Settlements, EPA, https://perma.cc/NLK6-ZPB4.
49. Id.; see also Marc Galanter, The Vanishing Trial: An Examination of Trials and Related Mat-
ters in Federal and State Courts, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 459, 459 (2004) (noting that
the percentage of “federal civil cases resolved by trial” had fallen to 1.8% in 2002). The
Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts reports that 0.5% of United States cases reached
trial in the twelve-month period ending in September 2018. See Table C-4, U.S. District
Courts—Civil Judicial Business, Civil Cases Terminated, by Nature of Suit and Action Taken—
During the 12-Month Period Ending September 30, 2017 and 2018, U.S. CTS. (2018), https://
perma.cc/YFZ5-GZ5H.
50. See McVean & Pidot, supra note 37, at 199–201; see also, e.g., Local 93, Int’l Ass’n of R
Firefighters v. City of Cleveland, 478 U.S. 501, 519 (1986).
51. United States v. Oregon, 913 F.2d 576, 580 (9th Cir. 1990).
52. 28 C.F.R. § 50.7(a) (2019).
53. See Foster & Foster, supra note 1, at 812–13. R
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in favor of either the agency or the defendant, and not for the true purpose of
remediating harm. For example, an agency may attempt to seek payments for
projects in program areas where there is a shortfall in the agency’s budget.54
Alternatively, a defendant may seek a project that otherwise fits the defendant’s
business plan. Without an actual finding by a court of liability and past harm, it
remains uncertain as to whether a defendant’s alleged violation caused harm,
how much harm, when, and where.
II. EVOLUTION OF ENVIRONMENTAL PROJECTS
This Part takes a closer look at the historical evolution of payments for
projects across court decisions and EPA guidance. The purpose is to highlight
the way in which the issues discussed above—harm, statutory authority, and
settlement—have interacted over time to produce the current opposition to
payments for projects in the Trump Administration.
A. Civil Penalty Authority
While the focus of this Article is not on federal appropriations, it is im-
portant to acknowledge the role of federal appropriations in the ongoing and
current controversy on the use of civil penalty authority for payments for
projects. Agencies must have authority from Congress to impose civil penalties,
and in granting this authority Congress often directs agencies to consider spe-
cific factors in determining civil penalties in any individual enforcement action.
For example, the CAA includes a statutory maximum for civil penalties, and
further directs consideration of a variety of factors, including the size of the
business, the violator’s compliance history, the gravity of the violation, and the
duration of the violation.55 EPA further issues policies describing how it will
apply the relevant statutory factors, considering the gravity of the violation, co-
operation of the defendant, and self-disclosure by the defendant.56 However a
penalty is decided, the Miscellaneous Receipts Act (“MRA”) requires that all
monies “received” by the government be deposited in the General Treasury Ac-
count and not be spent until appropriated by Congress.57 Furthermore, the
Anti-Deficiency Act (“ADA”) explicitly prohibits an officer or employee of the
United States from “mak[ing] or authoriz[ing] an expenditure or obligation
exceeding an amount available in an appropriation or fund for the expenditure
54. See Stop Settlement Slush Funds Act of 2016: Hearing on H.R. 5063, supra note 4. R
55. 42 U.S.C. § 7413(e) (2018).
56. See, e.g., EPA, 450R91101, CLEAN AIR ACT STATIONARY SOURCE CIVIL PENALTY POL-
ICY (1991), https://perma.cc/F7X6-NCSS; EPA, CLEAN AIR ACT MOBILE SOURCE CIVIL
PENALTY POLICY (2009), https://perma.cc/CHK3-4E2G.
57. 31 U.S.C. § 3302(b) (2018).
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or obligation.”58 Therefore, EPA cannot take payments in enforcement case
settlements and put the monies towards existing pollution reduction programs
that the agency operates.
The origins of payment for projects in environmental enforcement arose in
the 1980s with the issuance of EPA’s CAA and Clean Water Act (“CWA”)
penalty policy. This combined policy stated: “[O]ccasions have arisen in en-
forcement actions where violators have offered to make expenditures for envi-
ronmentally beneficial purposes above and beyond expenditures made to
comply with all existing legal requirements, in lieu of paying penalties to the
treasury of the enforcing government.”59 As one factor in its penalty calculation,
EPA began to provide discounts on the penalty if the defendant voluntarily
agreed, in a settlement, to complete a “supplemental environmental project”
(“SEP”).60
Soon after, in the early 1990s, members of Congress began to question the
legality of SEPs. In 1991, Representative John Dingell requested an opinion
from the Government Accountability Office’s (“GAO’s”) Comptroller General
on whether EPA could enter into a CAA settlement that allowed defendants to
“fund public awareness and other projects relating to vehicle air pollution in
exchange for reductions of the civil penalties assessed against them.”61 The
Comptroller General in 1992 found that:
[A]n interpretation of an agency’s prosecutorial authority to allow an
enforcement scheme involving supplemental projects that go beyond
remedying the violation in order to carry out other statutory goals of
the agency[] would permit the agency to improperly augment its ap-
propriations for those other purposes, in circumvention of the con-
gressional appropriations process.62
The Comptroller General further elaborated on its decision in a 1993 opinion,
stating that EPA’s authority did “not extend to remedies unrelated to the cor-
rection of the violation in question.”63
58. Id. § 1341.
59. CIVIL PENALTY POLICY – CLEAN WATER ACT VIOLATORS AND SECONDARY SOURCE
VIOLATORS OF THE CLEAN AIR ACT 15 (1980), EPA, https://perma.cc/TA96-Z583; see
also Edward Lloyd, Supplemental Environmental Projects Have Been Effectively Used in Citi-
zen Suits to Deter Future Violations as Well as to Achieve Significant Additional Environmental
Benefit, 10 WIDENER L. REV. 413, 415–16 (2004).
60. Lloyd, supra note 59, at 414. R
61. See generally U.S. Gov’t Accountability Office, B-247155, Opinion Letter on EPA Settle-
ment Authority Under 42 U.S.C. § 7524, 1992 U.S. Comp. Gen. LEXIS 1319 (July 7,
1992) (finding EPA lacks authority to settle actions over air pollution from a mobile source
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 7524); Peterson, supra note 28, at 353. R
62. U.S. Gov’t Accountability Office, B-247155.2, Opinion Letter Addressing EPA’s Response
to GAO Opinion Letter B-247155 at 2–3, 1993 WL 798227 (Mar. 1, 1993).
63. Id. at 1 (emphasis added).
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Several scholars and practitioners have engaged in debate over the applica-
bility of the MRA and ADA to payments for projects. Some scholars, including
Professors Kenneth Kristl and Andy Spalding, have argued that monies re-
ceived in environmental enforcement matters as part of an environmental pro-
ject, because they go from the defendant to a third-party non-profit
organization or entity rather than to the government, are not monies “received”
by the government, and thus do not trigger the MRA and ADA.64 Other schol-
ars and legal researchers and commentators, however, have argued that pay-
ments for projects in enforcement cases are simply a ruse for payments that
should have been part of the civil penalty in the first place. Professor Todd
Peterson explains that because DOJ has the power to litigate and resolve en-
forcement cases, it also has the power to “short circuit the [MRA] requirements
by agreeing to settlement terms that require the violator of a federal statute to
undertake certain responsibilities or actions that might inure to the benefit of
the executive branch.”65 Peterson suggests as an example that DOJ might re-
quire a violator to agree to take an action that DOJ would normally have to do
itself, thereby freeing up funds, outside of appropriations, that could be used in
some other way.66 Several legal commentators with groups such as the Charles
Koch Foundation, the Competitive Enterprise Institute, and the Heritage
Foundation have argued that the government is the only legitimate recipient of
money in the settlement of enforcement actions.67
The ongoing debate over appropriations has made it a central element of
EPA’s penalty policies. EPA’s SEP policies since the early 1990s have at-
tempted to address concerns over appropriations and augmentation.68 For ex-
ample, the SEP policies emphasize that SEPs are the product of settlement and
64. See Kenneth T. Kristl, Making a Good Idea Even Better: Rethinking the Limits on Supplemen-
tal Environmental Projects, 31 VT. L. REV. 217, 255–56 (2007); see also Andy Spalding, The
Much Misunderstood Miscellaneous Receipts Act (Part 2), FCPA BLOG (Sept. 30, 2014),
https://perma.cc/WFH8-S8SU.
65. Peterson, supra note 28, at 347–48. R
66. Id.
67. See Stop Settlement Slush Funds Act of 2016: Hearing on H.R. 5063, supra note 4 (testimony of R
Paul Figley, Professor, Associate Director of Legal Rhetoric at American University Wash-
ington College of Law); YEATMAN, supra note 4; Wilt, supra note 35, at 289; Benjamin R
Zycher, How Jeff Sessions Is Stopping the EPA’s Slush Fund, THE HILL (Aug. 20, 2017),
https://perma.cc/YR98-QSDH (“[T]he appropriate recipient of the funds is the U.S. Trea-
sury rather than some firm, industry or interest group that executive branch officials happen
to view with favor.”).
68. See EPA, SUPPLEMENTAL ENVIRONMENTAL PROJECTS POLICY (May 1, 1998), https://per
ma.cc/3EG7-B7EY; EPA, SUPPLEMENTAL ENVIRONMENTAL PROJECTS POLICY 2015
UPDATE (2015) [hereinafter EPA, 2015 UPDATED SEP POLICY], https://perma.cc/2KLV-
XQKL; Sylvia K. Lowrance, Acting Ass’t Admin. EPA, Memorandum to Regional Admin-
istrators, Supplemental Environmental Projects (SEP) Policy (Mar. 22, 2002), https://perma
.cc/4RUG-JSG2.
\\jciprod01\productn\H\HLE\44-1\HLE106.txt unknown Seq: 15  6-MAR-20 14:17
2020] Remedial Payments in Agency Enforcement 131
are purely voluntary.69 The SEP policies also describe several legal guidelines for
SEPs. SEPs must have a “nexus” to the underlying harm.70 In addition, EPA
must not control the funds in any way or recommend a particular recipient of
project funds, and may not support or provide additional resources for EPA or
other federal programs.71 Such restrictions undoubtedly limit options for pay-
ments for projects as SEPs.72
B. Injunctive Relief Authority
Payments for projects as components of injunctive relief raise a new set of
concerns. To be sure, the need for an appropriate nexus and conflicts with ap-
propriations and augmentation remain concerns in cases of payments for
projects as components of injunctive relief. However, injunctive relief raises ad-
ditional questions regarding whether such relief can only be prospective in na-
ture, or whether it can also be retrospective.73 Furthermore, payments for
projects as components of injunctive relief raise concerns over quantification of
harm.
In the early 1990s, two CWA cases, Public Interest Research Group of New
Jersey, Inc. v. Powell Duffryn Terminals, Inc.74 and United States v. Roll Coater,
Inc.,75 addressed whether a court could use its equitable authority to order a
payment for a project by a defendant as part of injunctive relief. In Powell Duf-
fryn, a case brought by a citizen group against a liquid storage facility, the dis-
trict court determined that paying civil penalties into the U.S. Treasury would
not satisfy the purposes of the CWA and instead ordered that defendants pay
the penalties into a trust fund to pay for projects that could directly affect envi-
ronmental problems in New Jersey.76 EPA, however, was concerned about the
MRA, and intervened in the case to argue that penalties could not be so di-
verted.77 The citizen group in Powell Duffryn argued that the court could use its
equitable discretion to order the payment.78 On review, the Third Circuit
agreed with the citizen group, noting: “[A] court may fashion injunctive relief
69. See, e.g., EPA, 2015 UPDATED SEP POLICY, supra note 68, at 2 (“This is a settlement policy R
and thus is not intended for use by the EPA, defendants, courts, or administrative law judges
at a hearing or in a trial.” (emphasis in original)).
70. Id. at 7.
71. Id. at 8–9.
72. Kristl, supra note 64, at 257; Lloyd, supra note 59, at 413. R
73. Lloyd, supra note 59, at 413. R
74. 913 F.2d 64, 81 (3d Cir. 1990).
75. 21 Envtl. L. Rep. 21,073 (S.D. Ind. Mar. 22, 1991).
76. Powell Duffryn, 913 F.2d at 68.
77. Id. at 81.
78. Id.
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requiring a defendant to pay monies into a remedial fund, if there is a nexus
between the harm and the remedy.”79
In Roll Coater, too, the court grappled with whether its equitable authority
could allow payments for projects. In Roll Coater, EPA won a case against a coil
coating company for violations of the CWA, including a $2 million penalty,
and the defendant company requested that the court allow the penalty to be
used for an environmental research project and the creation of a center for envi-
ronmental responsibility.80 In support of its request, the defendant argued that
equitable discretion allowed alternative forms of restitution, and the legislative
history of the CWA supported alternative projects to settle citizen suits.81 As in
Powell Duffryn, EPA argued that all penalties must go to the U.S. Treasury,
pursuant to the MRA. Judge McKinney rejected Roll Coater’s arguments, but
not because of a lack of authority. Indeed, the court, citing to Powell Duffryn,
stated that “if there is a nexus between the harm and the remedy,” a court may
fashion injunctive relief to require payment for projects.82 However, the court
did not use its equitable discretion to issue injunctive relief for allegations of
past harm in the case because there was no longer an equitable claim: plaintiffs
had already dismissed all claims for injunctive relief.83
Since the 1990s, the federal government has brought environmental en-
forcement claims specifically seeking injunctive relief to address past harm from
alleged violations. For example, in several CAA cases, such as United States v.
Cinergy84 and United States v. Westvaco,85 government plaintiffs alleged that
plants owned by defendants produced excess emissions above what they would
have produced at the source had it complied with the relevant new source re-
view (“NSR”) permitting program and installed requisite pollution-control
equipment.86 That is, plaintiffs claimed that they were entitled to two kinds of
injunctive relief. First, plaintiffs argued for prospective relief: actions to require
defendants to comply with the law and actually install the pollution control
equipment.87 Second, plaintiffs argued for retrospective relief: specific measures
79. Id. at 82. However, the Third Circuit ultimately overturned the district court’s decision;
because the district court had labeled the money as a “civil penalty,” the funds had to go to
the U.S. Treasury. See id.
80. See Roll Coater, 21 Envtl. L. Rep. at 21,077.
81. See id.
82. See id. at 21,077–78.
83. See id. at 21,074, 21,077–78; see also Lloyd, supra note 59. R
84. 582 F. Supp. 2d 1055 (S.D. Ind. 2008).
85. No. MJG-00-2602, 2015 WL 10323214 (D. Md. Feb. 26, 2015).
86. Westvaco, 2015 WL 10323214 at *5 (“The Government seeks to have the Court issue an
injunction ordering Westvaco to . . . mitigate the harm . . . .”); Cinergy, 582 F. Supp. 2d at
1057–58 (“[T]hey seek retrospective relief, through specific measures to reduce pollution at
Wabash River beyond what is required for prospective compliance to make up for the nearly
two decades of illegal pollution.” (internal citation omitted)).
87. See Cinergy, 582 F. Supp. 2d at 1057–58; Westvaco, 2015 WL 10323214 at *5.
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for the defendant to reduce pollution beyond what would be required for pro-
spective compliance, in order to make up for the excess emissions.88
Defendants in Cinergy and Westvaco argued that it was not possible to
isolate the harm from any excess emissions produced by the violating sources.
In Westvaco, for example, defendants argued against an injunction to remedy
generalized harm because all plaintiffs had done was establish that there had
been “some non-zero” increase in emissions from the stationary source.89 They
argued that in order to receive an injunction, plaintiffs “must quantify those
‘excess emissions’ to a reasonable degree of certainty, and must tie those ‘excess
emissions’ to actual harm that is more than trivial or de minimis.”90 In this case,
the court held that although “a precise determination of the adverse environ-
mental effect is impossible . . . the evidence has proven that, at a minimum, the
excess emissions from the Luke Mill caused [harm].”91
While some CAA cases seeking injunctive relief for past harm, like
Cinergy and Westvaco, have gone to trial, most have settled with payments for
projects, referred to as “mitigation projects,” or “other injunctive relief” as the
remedy.92 One practitioner notes, for example, that “[a] review of EPA settle-
ments through 2014 reveals at least 60 settlements that included mitigation.”93
In 2012, EPA issued guidance to staff on securing mitigation projects as in-
junctive relief in civil enforcement settlements.94 The 2012 guidance en-
couraged case teams to seek mitigation projects, where appropriate, as
components of the injunctive relief sought in civil judicial enforcement cases.95
The 2012 guidance distinguished mitigation projects from SEPs, stating that
because the purpose of mitigation is to restore the status quo ante as nearly as
possible, there must be a closer connection between a mitigation project and the
harm it redresses than the nexus required by a SEP.96 The guidance also notes
88. See Cinergy, 582 F. Supp. 2d at 1057–58.
89. Defendant Westvaco Corporation’s Response to the Government’s and to Luke Paper Com-
pany’s Proposed Findings of Fact and Proposed Conclusions of Law for Remedy Phase Trial
at 8, United States v. Westvaco Corp., No. MJG-00-2602, 2015 WL 10323214 (D. Md.
Apr. 12, 2013).
90. Id.
91. Memorandum of Decision-Remedy Phase at 24, United States v. Westvaco Corp., No.
MJG-00-2602, 2015 WL 10323214 (D. Md. Feb. 26, 2015).
92. See David Markell, EPA Enforcement: A Heightened Emphasis on Mitigation Relief, ABA
TRENDS (Mar. 1, 2014), https://perma.cc/9D5L-W9GJ.
93. Carrick Brooke-Davidson, EPA’s Mitigation Memorandum: New Challenges in Civil Enforce-
ment, 2016 ABA ENVTL. ENFORCEMENT & CRIMES COMMITTEE NEWSL. 4, 5.
94. Memorandum from Susan Shinkman, Dir., EPA Office of Civil Enforcement, to Reg’l
Counsels et al., Securing Mitigation as Injunctive Relief in Certain Civil Enforcement Set-
tlements (Nov. 14, 2012), https://perma.cc/R2QH-UPYV.
95. Id. at 1.
96. Id. at 4.
\\jciprod01\productn\H\HLE\44-1\HLE106.txt unknown Seq: 18  6-MAR-20 14:17
134 Harvard Environmental Law Review [Vol. 44
that the distinction may be difficult to grasp in practice.97 For the most part,
however, throughout the end of the Bush Administration and the Obama Ad-
ministration, many environmental enforcement cases settled with mitigation
projects.
Mitigation projects took a sharp turn, however, after the Volkswagen
CAA enforcement settlement as part of the “diesel gate” scandal in 2016, corre-
sponding with the incoming new Trump Administration. In September 2015,
Volkswagen Group of America (“Volkswagen”) made the phrase “defeat device”
ubiquitous across the world, as part of the “diesel gate” or “diesel dupe” scandal.
Volkswagen admitted to EPA and the California Air Resources Board that its
diesel cars were equipped with defeat device software that detects when emis-
sions tests are taking place by inspectors on a dynamometer, a stationary labora-
tory test.98 When inspectors were testing the cars, pollution controls turned on,
and the rest of the time, when cars were in use on the road, pollution controls
turned off. Shortly after Volkswagen’s admission, major newspapers around the
world featured headline stories of the cheating scheme and Volkswagen’s stock
price took a significant hit.99
In December 2015, DOJ filed a complaint against Volkswagen, alleging
violations of the CAA in federal court.100 The complaint sought civil penalties
as well as injunctive relief. As prospective injunctive relief, the complaint asked
the court to require Volkswagen to require actions to bring the company back
into compliance.101 The complaint also alleged harm to the environment from
Volkswagen’s excess emissions, and asked for the court to use its equitable au-
thority to require mitigation.102 In June 2016, the parties reached settlement on
claims for both prospective and retrospective injunctive relief, and filed a pro-
posed judicial consent decree.103 The first part of the proposed partial consent
decree required Volkswagen to remove at least eighty-five percent of the violat-
ing vehicles from the road by June 2019, as prospective injunctive relief aimed
at stopping the violation.104
97. Id. at 8 (discussing generally the timing of discussions with defendants so as to not confuse
SEPs and mitigation).
98. Jack Ewing, Engineering a Deception: What Led to Volkswagen’s Diesel Scandal, N.Y. TIMES
(Mar. 16, 2017), https://perma.cc/J9S6-E4YH; Jeff S. Bartlett, Michelle Naranjo & Jeff
Plungis, Guide to the Volkswagen Emission Recall, CONSUMER REPORTS (Oct. 23, 2017)
(discussing “on-road” and “dyno” modes), https://perma.cc/A8V2-FRMY.
99. Ewing, supra note 98. R
100. Complaint, In re Volkswagen AG, No. 2:16-cv-10006 (E.D. Mich. Jan. 4, 2016).
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. See Volkswagen Clean Air Act Settlement, EPA, https://perma.cc/W3LU-68TD.
104. Volkswagen may meet the eighty-five percent removal requirement by buying back violating
vehicles from owners and lessees and scrapping the vehicles. Volkswagen may also meet the
eighty-five percent removal requirement by offering to vehicle owners and lessees, an EPA-
approved emissions partial fix that substantially reduces the NOx emissions of the violating
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The second and third parts of the proposed partial consent decree focused
on two different kinds of retrospective injunctive relief. The proposed partial
consent decree required Volkswagen to establish a $2.7 billion Environmental
Mitigation Trust (the “Trust”) for states and tribes to use for specified actions
aimed at reducing diesel emissions from a variety of sources in the transporta-
tion sector.105 In addition, the proposed partial consent decree required Volk-
swagen to invest $2 billion in zero-emission vehicle (“ZEV”) charging
infrastructure in order to undo the harm posed by “consumers’ unwitting
purchase of vehicles” that they mistakenly thought were environmentally
friendly.106 The partial consent decree released Volkswagen from liability asso-
ciated with claims for injunctive relief, including allegations of generalized
harm.107 The partial consent decree specifically did not release Volkswagen
from civil penalty as the projects were not SEPs.108
As required by regulation, the federal government took public comment
on the proposed consent decree.109 DOJ received twelve hundred public com-
ments during the public comment period, and while most involved the buyback
provisions, several addressed payments for projects in the Trust and the ZEV
commitment.110 Commenters questioned whether the language of Section 204
of the CAA to “restrain violations” provided the court with the authority to
approve a settlement with mitigation requirements or only allowed for prospec-
tive injunctive relief.111 Commenters also expressed concern that the money de-
fendants were required to spend on mitigation obligations illegally diverted civil
penalty funds that should go to the U.S. Treasury.112 Still others commented
that certain projects not listed as eligible project options in the partial consent
decree—like projects aimed at stopping trucks from idling at rest areas113—
vehicles. See Third Partial and 3.0L Second Partial and 2.0L Partial and Amended Consent
Decrees, In re Volkswagen “Clean Diesel” Marketing, Sales Practices, and Prods. Liab. Li-
tig. (N.D. Cal. June 28, 2016, Sept. 30, 2016, Dec. 20, 2016, and Jan. 11, 2017), https://per
ma.cc/7DVM-BYE2.
105. Volkswagen Clean Air Act Settlement, supra note 103. R
106. United States’ Notice of Motion, Motion, and Memorandum in Support of Entry of Partial
Consent Decree at 20, In re Volkswagen, No. 3:16-cv-00295, 2016 WL 6460404 (E.D.
Mich. Sept. 30, 2016), [hereinafter United States Motion to Enter, In re Volkswagen].
107. Amended 2.0L Partial Consent Decree ¶¶ 74–83, In re Volkswagen (E.D. Mich. Dec. 20,
2016) (No. 2:16-cv-10006).
108. See id. ¶ 75.
109. See 40 C.F.R. § 300.430(c)(5)(ii) (2019).
110. See United States Motion to Enter, In re Volkswagen, supra note 106, at 21. R
111. United States Motion to Enter, In re Volkswagen, supra note 106, Ex. 5: Department of R
Justice Response to Comments, at 14.
112. See id. at 15.
113. See id. at 20.
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would also reduce NOx, and therefore should be added.114 The court approved
a judicial consent decree between the parties in October 2016.115
III. THE PURPOSE OF ENVIRONMENTAL PROJECTS
It is time to take a step back from the federal appropriations and legal
authority questions surrounding payments for projects to examine the purpose
of such payments and projects. Payments for projects are valuable elements of
enforcement case resolutions to address harm from violations. However, be-
cause payments for projects have been elements of both civil penalty and in-
junctive relief authorities, they have served multiple enforcement goals at the
same time, beyond addressing harm from violations. The remedial purpose of
payments for projects has intermixed with deterrence, restitution, and compen-
sation purposes.
A. Deterrence and Punishment
Environmental advocates and scholars often decry the “nexus” requirement
that EPA has imposed on SEPs, and argue that EPA has not utilized SEPs
enough or for the right kinds of projects.116 They argue, for instance, that SEPs
tend to tailor too close to punishing the defendant rather than broader goals of
benefiting the public at large.117 Community input is severely lacking in selec-
tion decisions about SEPs in individual enforcement cases.118 In addition, envi-
ronmental advocates and scholars argue that payments for projects in
enforcement cases have been “ad hoc.”119 They have noted, for example, that
negotiations about projects in enforcement case resolutions seem to happen be-
hind closed doors and as a result, non-profit groups and government agencies
have little ability to raise concerns about specific impacts or suggest potential
projects.120
One barrier to addressing this problem is the fact that the very authority
on which SEPs rest, civil penalty, is one of the key reasons for the weakness of
SEPs. Courts have found that civil penalties are primarily legal, rather than
equitable, in nature. While the Supreme Court has held that sanctions or civil
penalties frequently serve more than one purpose, “a civil sanction that cannot
114. See id. at 17.
115. Volkswagen Clean Air Act Settlement, supra note 103. R
116. See Kristl, supra note 64, at 259–61; David Markell, Is There a Possible Role for Regulatory R
Enforcement in the Effort to Value, Protect, and Restore Ecosystem Services?, 22 J. LAND USE &
ENVTL. L. 549, 589–93 (2007).
117. Foster & Foster, supra note 1, at 819. R
118. Id. at 812–14; Simms, supra note 2, at 10,525. R
119. Foster & Foster, supra note 1, at 811. R
120. Id. at 812–14; Simms, supra note 2, at 10,525. R
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fairly be said solely to serve a remedial purpose, but rather can only be explained
as also serving either retributive or deterrent purposes, is punishment, as we
have come to understand the term.”121 The primary purpose of civil penalties
issued by agencies is to punish defendants and deter future misconduct. Thus,
although using SEPs to serve remedial purposes is possible, such use is some-
what like fitting the proverbial square peg inside of a round hole.
In addition, the voluntary nature of SEPs contributes to the weakness of
using civil penalty authority to address past harm from violations. SEPs are
merely one factor in a list of other factors available for discounting civil penalty.
As a result, SEPs may simply not be worth it for defendants, particularly in
small penalty cases or where other methods of decreasing the penalty, such as
cooperation, are available. It is true that defendants may receive intangible ben-
efits from SEPs separate and apart from any penalty reduction, such as im-
provement of public relations with local communities after a violation.122
However, SEPs can also take a lot of work to implement for defendants whose
primary mission is manufacturing goods or services, not organizing and coordi-
nating environmental projects. Even where defendants do not conduct SEPs,
but rather pay a third party to do so, there are often significant administrative
hassles to deal with, such as choosing the right third-party organization, and
reporting to the agency under the settlement terms.
Thus, while some scholars may like to see more SEPs and think that SEPs
should be the rule not the exception, SEPs are a product of a negotiated settle-
ment only, and there is no legal authority or “hook” to require a defendant to
conduct a SEP. While EPA policy encourages case teams to negotiate SEPs, it
remains up to the defendant to agree.
Even when agencies attempt to achieve a redress goal for harm through
SEPs, courts may focus on the punitive and deterrence goals first. For example,
in United States v. Lexington-Fayette Urban County Government,123 after a dis-
trict court blocked a proposed consent decree involving CWA violations
brought against the city of Lexington, having found that some of the penalty
money would have been better off as SEP, the Sixth Circuit remanded the
district court’s decision. Commenters on the proposed consent decree had re-
marked that the $425,000 penalty was too high and that the money should have
gone to address a neglected sewer problem.124 In its motion to enter the settle-
ment filed with the district court, meanwhile, the government had explained
121. Kokesh v. SEC, 137 S. Ct. 1635, 1645 (2017) (quoting United States v. Bajakajian, 524
U.S. 321, 331 (1998)).
122. Eileen D. Millett, A Step Too Far from a “SEP” in the Right Direction, 33 THE PRACTICAL
REAL ESTATE LAWYER 5 (2017) (“Corporations will willingly implement SEPs rather than
pay money in penalties because they believe the money is well spent on a SEP, or they
believe that they will receive a public relations benefit.”).
123. 591 F.3d 484 (6th Cir. 2010).
124. Id. at 486.
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the importance of high civil penalties to operate as a “deterrent to future non-
compliance by the defendant and by others.”125 The district court had agreed
with the commenters, finding that a large part of the penalty money could be
better utilized by additional SEPs or by application of a portion of the penalty
money to remedial work required by the consent decree.126 However, the Sixth
Circuit reversed and remanded, relying heavily on the importance of deterrence
in enforcement.127 The Sixth Circuit found that “rejecting a civil penalty as too
high because of the greater seriousness of the violation, or because the penalty
money could be used for remediation, is in tension with, rather than in accor-
dance with, the statutory purpose behind civil penalties.”128 The court acknowl-
edged that remediation might be better, but found that if Congress had
thought that a violator’s civil penalty money should go towards a remedial goal,
it would not have provided for civil penalties.129
To be clear, SEPs can serve a remedial purpose. Arguably, a tighter nexus
requirement actually does more to remediate the actual harm from a violation.
In some situations, the nexus is clear. Other times, however, the nexus may not
be clear, or more likely, the SEP focuses more on punishing the defendant than
remedying harm to the environment or public health. As described by Profes-
sors Charles Foster and Frances Foster,
reform-minded judges, legislators, enforcement officials, parties, and
scholars have called attention to the need to apply some portion of
settlement funds to credit projects and have explored innovative ways
to do so. Yet, these approaches have ultimately failed to achieve their
potential because they are at best supplementary and remain “sub-
servient to the deterrence policy served by [monetary] penalties.”130
Thus, even though SEPs can serve a remedial purpose, it is difficult to make
remedial purpose a primary goal.
B. Restitution and Prevention
The federal government has also argued in enforcement cases that pay-
ments for projects are akin to the equitable remedy of restitution.131 The theory
behind restitution is to deprive defendant wrongdoers by recovering funds that
125. Id. at 487.
126. Id.
127. Id. at 488–91.
128. Id. at 487.
129. Id. at 487–88.
130. Foster & Foster, supra note 1, at 786. R
131. Wilt, supra note 35, at 295 (“Proponents of the consumer relief provisions claim that the R
provisions constitute a kind of ‘restitution’ or ‘remediation’ of harm.”).
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are equivalent to the defendant’s ill-gotten gain.132 Restitution allows such re-
covered funds to return to plaintiffs, placing a victim in the same position she
would have occupied without the defendant’s act.133 That is, restitution refers
both to “disgorgement,” taking a benefit away, and to restoring the status
quo.134
The question in environmental enforcement cases has been whether prin-
ciples of restitution can provide for payments for cleanup of past harm. The
Supreme Court loosely addressed this question in a RCRA case, Meghrig v.
KFC Western, Inc.135 In Meghrig, the Court found that individual plaintiffs
could not recover costs already paid for in remediation under RCRA, because
the relevant RCRA provision did not provide compensation for past cleanup
efforts like CERCLA did.136 The plaintiff in Meghrig, a restaurant company,
had purchased a site to build a restaurant franchise and learned during the con-
struction process that the site contained hazardous waste.137 The county govern-
ment ordered the restaurant company to pay for remediation, and in Meghrig,
the company sought recovery of such payments from the previous owners.138
The district court in Meghrig held that RCRA “does not permit recovery of past
cleanup costs and that [RCRA generally] does not authorize a cause of action
for the remediation of toxic waste.”139 The Ninth Circuit reversed, finding that
the “district court had authority under [RCRA] to award restitution of past
cleanup costs.”140 The Supreme Court reversed the Ninth Circuit, distinguish-
ing CERCLA from RCRA in the remedies each provides.141
The federal government filed an amicus brief in the Meghrig case, arguing
that RCRA does not preclude an award of past cleanup costs.142 Instead of
relying on the remedies expressly provided in RCRA, the federal government
argued that because district courts retain inherent authority to award any equi-
table remedy not expressly taken away from them by Congress, a plaintiff could
seek recovery of costs while the waste at issue continues.143 Equitable restitution
132. George P. Roach, A Default Rule of Omnipotence: Implied Jurisdiction and Exaggerated Reme-
dies in Equity for Federal Agencies, 12 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 1, 7 (2007).
133. Randall v. Loftsgaarden, 478 U.S. 647, 671–72 (1986).
134. See Restitution, CORNELL L. SCH. LEGAL INFO. INST.: WEX, https://perma.cc/SWV2-
A4YB.
135. 516 U.S. 479 (1996).
136. Id. at 484–88.
137. Id. at 481.
138. Id. at 481–82.
139. Id. at 482.
140. Id.
141. Id. at 484–85.
142. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners, Meghrig v. KFC
Western, Inc., 516 U.S. 479 (1996) (No. 95-83), 1995 WL 702807 (citing Porter v. Warner
Holding Co., 328 U.S. 395 (1946)).
143. Id.
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would allow recovery of money previously spent on cleanup efforts.144 The Su-
preme Court in Meghrig declined to opine on the government’s argument re-
garding RCRA equitable restitution, but it did suggest a potential comparison
of such a concept to a Third Circuit case involving a request for an injunction
to require the funding of certain projects in response to water contamination:
United States v. Price.145
Price involved a landfill that for years accepted hazardous waste without
proper authorization, and mismanaged the handling of the waste in such a way
as to cause significant threats of leaking into the local public water system.146
The federal government brought an action requesting an injunction that would
require owners of the contaminated site to pay for, among other things, a diag-
nostic study of the area surrounding the landfill.147 The district court decided
that such a diagnostic study was “an inappropriate form of preliminary equita-
ble relief” because it “would have required monetary payments.”148 As described
by the Third Circuit, “in the eyes of the district court, it was an attempt to
transform a claim for damages into an equitable action by asking for an injunc-
tion that orders the payment of money.”149 The Third Circuit however, over-
turned the district court, finding that damages are a form of substitutional
redress, but a “request for funds for a diagnostic study of the public health
threat posed by the continuing contamination and its abatement is not, in any
sense, a traditional form of damages.”150 The Third Circuit further held that
“the funding of a diagnostic study in the present case, though it would require
monetary payments, would be preventive rather than compensatory.”151 The
study was a step in the remedial process of abating an existing but growing toxic
hazard.
Courts have similarly used equitable authority to allow for payments for
remedial purposes under the CAA. In United States v. Cinergy, defendants ar-
gued that unlike CERCLA, the CAA did not contemplate remedial mea-
sures.152 The defendants in Cinergy distinguished the CAA as a forward-
looking pollution prevention statute that does not include expansive equitable
powers for courts.153 The government plaintiffs acknowledged that “it is impos-
sible to scrub from the environment the pollution that Cinergy has already
144. Id. at 22–28 (discussing Porter v. Warner Holding Co., 328 U.S. 395 (1946)).
145. Meghrig, 516 U.S. at 488 (citing United States v. Price, 688 F.2d 204, 211–13 (3d Cir.
1982)).
146. Price, 688 F.2d at 208–09.
147. Id. at 207–08.
148. Id. at 211.
149. Id.
150. Id. at 212.
151. Id.
152. See United States v. Cinergy Corp., 582 F. Supp. 2d 1055, 1064–65 (S.D. Ind. 2008).
153. Id.
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emitted or bring back the good health of those harmed by these illegal emis-
sions.”154 Instead, the government plaintiffs argued that the best possible
method to redress the illegal emissions is to order future pollution reductions,
and that such an order would be “analogous to the traditional remedy of dis-
gorgement of ill-gotten gains.”155 The district court agreed, finding that
an order requiring [defendants] to take actions that remedy, mitigate,
and offset harms caused to the public and the environment by [its]
past CAA violations would seem to give effect to the CAA’s purpose
“to protect and enhance the quality of the Nation’s air resources so as
to promote the public health and welfare.”156
Furthermore, the court concluded, “its equitable authority granted by [the
CAA] includes the authority to order relief aimed at redressing the harms
caused by [defendant’s] established violations of the CAA. In other words, this
Court’s equitable authority is not limited to providing prospective relief only.”157
In particular, in CAA cases, the courts have been willing to use equitable
authorities to allow for payments for remedial purposes where the payment goes
to a preventative project. In the remedy phase of trial for both the Cinergy case
and in Westvaco, the respective district courts required the submission of
“remediation” proposals. The courts analyzed the remediation proposals by
looking at whether the proposed projects would confer maximum environmen-
tal benefits, were achievable as a practical matter, bore an equitable relationship
to the degree and kind of wrong they are intended to remedy, and were not
punitive in nature.158 In both Cinergy and Westvaco, the courts first evaluated
projects that would involve “beyond compliance” activities. Such projects would
involve no third-party payment whatsoever. Both courts, failing to find ade-
quate projects at the source, turned towards projects that would reduce the rele-
vant emissions somewhere in the same airshed.159 However, in the end, the
154. Plaintiffs’ Trial Brief at 14, United States v. Cinergy Corp., 618 F. Supp. 2d 942 (S.D. Ind.
Jan. 9, 2009) (No. 1:99-cv-01693-LJM-JMS).
155. Id. at 14–15.
156. Cinergy, 582 F. Supp. 2d at 1061 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 7401 (2018)).
157. Id. at 1062. In addition, in a 1985 decision, United States v. Holtzman, 762 F.2d 720 (9th
Cir. 1985), the district court held that its authority under CAA Title II to “restrain” viola-
tions includes both the power to enjoin otherwise lawful activity and to “correct or dissipate”
the harmful effects of past violations, id. at 724.
158. See United States v. Cumberland Farms of Conn., Inc., 826 F.2d 1151, 1164 (1st Cir.
1987)); United States v. Cinergy Corp., 618 F. Supp. 2d 942, 967 (S.D. Ind. 2008) (quoting
United States v. Deaton, 332 F.3d 698, 714 (4th Cir. 2003)); Memorandum of Decision –
Remedy Phase at 34, United States v. Westvaco, No. MJG-00-2602 (D. Md. Feb. 26,
2015).
159. The court in Cinergy considered whether the defendant company could mitigate or offset
past harm by installing pollution control at non-violating units located at the same plant.
Cinergy, 618 F. Supp. 2d at 967. However, because the emissions at the non-violating units
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Seventh Circuit overturned the Cinergy case on other grounds before the dis-
trict court ever issued an order requiring mitigation projects, and the Westvaco
case settled.160
While no court has yet had occasion to award payments for preventative
projects as equitable restitution under the CAA, many courts have approved
settlements with such payments. Funds recovered from claims of retrospective
injunctive relief in CAA enforcement case settlements have gone towards a
variety of projects seeking to prevent future harm, including those projects in-
volving “beyond compliance”, as in the Cinergy and Westvaco litigation, which
are arguably most akin to restitution. For example, in United States v. Mosaic
Fertilizer, LLC,161 the approved CAA enforcement settlement involved a miti-
gation project requiring defendants to upgrade “the catalyst on the E Train to
lower emissions well below its currently permitted level,” where the complaint
alleged violations at the A and D trains of the facility. Yet courts have also
approved projects that do not involve “beyond compliance” at a defendant’s site,
but instead abate an existing air pollution problem in the air generally.162 Mo-
bile source cases like Volkswagen, involving payments for projects to reduce
NOx emissions in the future, are examples.
C. Compensation and Damages
Traditional notions of compensatory damages in environmental cases usu-
ally do not come up in statutory environmental enforcement cases. Damages are
more likely to occur in environmental tort cases.163 However, federal district
courts have held that natural resource damages under statutes like CERCLA
were significantly greater than those from the violating units, the court in Cinergy held that
for the court to require pollution control technology at the non-violating units would exceed
any mitigation remedy justified by plaintiff’s evidence of irreparable harm. Id. The court in
Westvaco looked at similar project proposals for “beyond compliance” projects, but found that
requirements to install pollution control technology would not be achievable as a practical
matter because defendants had transferred ownership of the stationary source to a new
owner. Memorandum of Decision – Remedy Phase, supra note 158, at 31. The court rea-
soned that a new owner, one that did not cause the violation, would have to install the
pollution control technology at both boilers, and there would be insurmountable conflicts
between the current owner and the former owner. Id.
160. See United States v. Cinergy Corp., 623 F.3d 455, 460–61 (7th Cir. 2010); Memorandum
and Order Approving Consent Decree, Westvaco, No. MJG-00-2602 (D. Md. Aug. 26,
2016).
161. Mosaic Fertilizer, LLC Information Air Act Settlement, EPA (Oct. 5, 2009), https://perma.cc/
C8JB-3BEU.
162. See generally Volkswagen Clean Air Act Settlement, supra note 103. R
163. See, e.g., Tiongco v. Sw. Energy Prod. Co., 214 F. Supp. 3d 279, 282–83 (W.D. Pa. 2016)
(finding that a plaintiff individual may recover money from a defendant’s drilling activities
near her property that she demonstrates caused dust, and that the compensation is likely to
mirror the cost of cleaning the dust and repairing any damage to her home).
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are fundamentally legal in nature; that is, such damages are akin to compensat-
ing the plaintiff for injury to its property, much like damages recovered in nui-
sance or trespass.164 CERCLA provides for plaintiff government agencies to
seek compensation for damages resulting from both direct and indirect injury,
destruction, and loss.165 The appropriate amount of compensation considers re-
placement value, use value, and the ability of the ecosystem or resource to re-
cover.166 The process for determining the amount of damages for compensating
the loss of the natural resource is lengthy and complex. Trustees conduct natu-
ral resource damage assessments (“NRDAs”) to identify what resource was in-
jured, how much it was injured, and how much it will cost to restore it to its
“baseline” condition.167 NRDAs then form the basis for calculating damages
assessed against potentially responsible parties (“PRPs”) in court actions.
No provision under the CAA, however, allows for compensatory damages
for loss to natural resources or public health from injurious conduct. There is no
sanctioned NRDA process to examine the impact of CAA or CWA violations
on natural resources. There is no “public health damage assessment” process to
examine the impact of CAA or CWA violations on public health. Such a pro-
cess could allow for an understanding of the impact on the public from air or
water violations, akin to what CERCLA provides for the study of the impact
on the public from releases of hazardous substances. Unfortunately, it does not
exist within the CAA or CWA.
However, CAA enforcement violations can cause damage to natural re-
sources, and courts have approved CAA enforcement settlements with pay-
ments for projects to restore such resources. In addition to natural resource
damage authorizing statutes involving oil spills or chemical releases, like CER-
CLA and the Oil Pollution Act, some federal agencies have authority to seek
damages resulting from injuries to federal lands. The U.S. Forest Service
(“USFS”), under the Restoration of National Forest Lands and Improvements
164. See In re Acushnet River & New Bedford Harbor Proceedings re Alleged PCB Pollution,
712 F. Supp. 994, 1000 (D. Mass. 1989) (stating action for compensatory restoration dam-
ages “sounds basically in tort,” presents fundamentally legal issues, and “must be tried to a
jury as a matter of right”); see also United States v. Viking Res., 607 F. Supp. 2d 808, 832
(S.D. Tex. 2009) (“[A]t least one component of natural resource damages—the diminution
in value of those natural resources pending restoration—is legal in nature. It amounts to
compensating the plaintiff for injury to its property, much like damages recovered in nui-
sance or trespass—both classic legal causes of action.”).
165. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(c) (2018); see also id. § 9651(c) (“Such regulations shall identify the best
available procedures to determine such damages, including both direct and indirect injury,
destruction, or loss and shall take into consideration factors including, but not limited to,
replacement value, use value, and ability of the ecosystem or resource to recover.”) In addi-
tion, § 9607(f) elaborates: “the measure of such damages shall not be limited by the sums
which can be used to restore or replace such resources.”
166. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(c).
167. 15 C.F.R. § 990 (2019); 43 C.F.R. § 11 (2019).
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Act, has the authority to accept any monies outside of appropriations received
by the United States as a result of a judgment, compromise, or settlement of
any claim, involving present or potential damage to USFS lands.168 The Na-
tional Park Service (“NPS”), under the Park System Resource Protection Act
(“PSRPA”), has similarly broad authority to pursue claims involving damage to
federal lands. The PSRPA requires that any monies recovered by the federal
government under any federal, state, or local law or regulation or otherwise, as a
result of injury to NPS lands, be available to the NPS, outside of appropria-
tions.169 Typically, the USFS and the NPS have used these authorities to ad-
dress damages resulting from wildfires, car accidents, vessel groundings, and
other similar events.170
Several NSR enforcement cases too have alleged claims of damage to fed-
eral lands, primarily from acid rain.171 In Westvaco, plaintiffs alleged specific
damage to nearby federal lands from excess emissions from the large stationary
sources at issue.172 During the Westvaco trial, the superintendent of Shenandoah
National Park testified about the natural resources within the park at risk by the
air pollution from the defendant’s plant.173 Additional NPS and USFS scientists
testified about how acidic deposition had affected both Shenandoah National
Park and Monongahela National Forest.174 The settlement in Westvaco then
included payments to the NPS and USFS, under each agency’s authority, to
accept funds from claims involving damage to public lands for restoration
168. Pub. L. No. 85-464, 72 Stat. 216, 216–17 (codified at 16 U.S.C. § 579c (2018)) (“An act to
facilitate and simplify the work of the Forest Service, and for other purposes.”); Federal Land
Policy and Management Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-579, tit. III, § 305, 90 Stat. 2743,
2765 (codified at 43 U.S.C. § 1735 (2018)). There is little legislative history on the RN-
FLA, but the legislative history on the PSRPA indicates a clear intent to authorize NPS to
use recovered funds outside of the normal appropriations process. In December 1986, a
freighter ran aground on a coral reef in Biscayne National Park in Florida, damaging over
6,000 square feet of coral. The company owning the freighter subsequently settled with the
DOJ for $40,000, which the DOJ deposited as miscellaneous funds in the U.S. Treasury. See
S. REP. NO. 101-328, at 603 (1990).
169. 54 U.S.C. § 100724 (2018) (formerly codified at 16 U.S.C. § 19jj-3). Interestingly, as of the
date of this Article, the Fish and Wildlife Service Resource Protection Act (“FWSRPA”),
currently pending in Congress, would provide authority to the FWS to also accept any mon-
ies outside of appropriations received by the United States as a result of a judgment, compro-
mise, or settlement of any claim, involving present or potential damage to FWS lands. See
H.R. 1326, 116th Cong. (2019).
170. Karen Bradshaw, Settling for Natural Resource Damages, 40 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 211,
238–39 (2016).
171. See generally Nitrogen and Sulfur Pollution in Parks, U.S. NAT’L PARK SERV., https://perma
.cc/UZ57-VXMQ.
172. Plaintiff’s Pretrial Brief at 21, United States v. Westvaco Corp., No. MJG-00-2602 (D. Md.
Nov. 28, 2012).
173. United States’ Proposed Findings of Fact (Remedy Phase) at 72, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
176166, Westvaco, No. MJG-00-2602 (D. Md. Mar. 15, 2013).
174. Id. at 77–82.
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projects, such as watershed limestone lining, and revegetation and reforestation
to improve natural abilities to buffer acid impacts.175
Courts have approved several other CAA enforcement case settlements
with payments to NPS and USFS, beyond Cinergy and Westvaco. For example,
the 2003 VEPCO settlement included requirements for defendants to pay $1
million to NPS to implement a project “intended to reduce damage to those
resources caused by air pollution suffered by [Shenandoah National] Park.”176
In addition, the 2007 American Electric Power settlement included requirements
for defendants to pay $2 million to NPS for the restoration of land, watersheds,
vegetation, and forests in one of several areas alleged in the underlying action to
have been injured by emissions from defendants’ facilities, including Shenan-
doah National Park, Mammoth Cave National Park, and Great Smoky Moun-
tains National Park.177 The 2012 Louisiana Generating case,178 which settled
only a few days before the start of a scheduled liability trial, also included re-
quirements for defendants to pay $1 million total to the NPS and USFS for
restoration projects on Jean Lafitte National Historical Park and Preserve,
Vicksburg National Military Park, the Natchez Trace Parkway, and Kisatchie
National Forest.179 Lastly, under the Volkswagen partial consent decree, the
Trustee is required, at the end of the life of the Trust, to give any remaining
funds in the Trust to federal land agencies.180 The agencies must use such funds
to pay for diesel-emission reduction projects, but since the harm in Volkswagen
was nationwide, the projects can be located on any federal lands impacted by
NOx emissions.181
Courts have also found that payments for projects in CAA enforcement
cases qualify as remediation costs under defendants’ insurance contracts, akin to
costs associated with CERCLA. For example, in the Louisiana Generating
CAA settlement, the defendant company agreed to pay for several projects,
specifically to resolve alleged equitable claims for retrospective injunctive re-
lief.182 Such projects included payments for electric vehicle-charging infrastruc-
ture in southern Louisiana, solar panel installation at schools, and restoration of
175. Memorandum and Order Approving Consent Decree, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 114691, at
*17, Westvaco, No. MJG-00-2602, (D. Md. Aug. 26, 2016).
176. Consent Decree at 7, app. B, United States v. Va. Elec. & Power Co., No. 1:03-cv-00517
(E.D. Va. Oct. 3, 2003).
177. Consent Decree, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 104330, at *129, United States v. Am. Elec. Power
Serv. Corp., No. C2-99-1250 (S.D. Ohio Oct. 9, 2007).
178. United States v. La. Generating LLC, No. 09-100-JJB-RLB, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
142349 (M.D. La. Mar. 5, 2012).
179. Consent Decree at 67, United States v. La. Generating LLC, No. 09-100-JJB-RLB, 2012
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 142349 (M.D. La. Mar. 5, 2012).
180. Partial Consent Decree at 20, app. D, In re Volkswagen “Clean Diesel” Mktg., Sales Prac-
tices, and Prods. Liability Litig., No. 2672 CRN (JSC) (N.D. Cal. Sept. 30, 2016).
181. Id.
182. Louisiana Generating Settlement, EPA (Nov. 21, 2012), https://perma.cc/HC2B-MEY9.
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lands at nearby national parks.183 The company later sought coverage for the
projects under its insurance policy, which covered “remediation costs” defined
as “reasonable expenses incurred to investigate, quantify, monitor, mitigate,
abate, remove, dispose, treat, neutralize, or immobilize pollution conditions to
the extent required by environmental law.”184 The insurance company argued
that the actions required under the consent decree did not clean up the residue
from past emissions, and therefore were not remediation costs.185 The insurance
company’s expert specifically argued, “[o]nce air pollution has settled on the
ground or the water, people no longer breathe it, and it no longer poses a threat
through inhalation.”186 Similar to arguments made in the Cinergy case, the in-
surance company further asserted that the CAA handles ongoing or future pol-
lution, and it is the squarely remedial statutes, such as CERCLA, that should
handle any past air pollution that may leave a toxic residue, like lead or mer-
cury.187 The Fifth Circuit however, disagreed with the insurance company,
finding: “Because of the [company’s] past emissions, there [are] more pollutants
and pollutant byproducts in the air, and more pollution-related damage to nat-
ural resources, than there would have been absent the past emissions. Future
emissions contribute to this geographically diffuse, intermingled body of harm
exactly the same way.”188
IV. CURRENT CONTROVERSY
Despite the multiple purposes served by payments for projects, they are
once again causing controversy in the Trump Administration. The same con-
cerns over appropriations, equitable authority, quantification of harm, and set-
tlement have resurfaced. As this Part discusses, the concerns have resulted in
multiple guidance documents from DOJ limiting the scope of both SEPs and
mitigation dramatically. Furthermore, the guidance documents have been used
to justify the government entering into settlements of enforcement violations
without any remedy for past harm to the environment and public health.
A. New Guidance
The payments for projects in the Volkswagen partial consent decree imme-
diately raised appropriations and legal authority concerns in Congress and the
newly elected Trump Administration. In 2016, members of Congress intro-
duced a bill, the Stop Settlement Slush Funds Act, which would bar mandatory
183. Id.
184. Expert Report of Michael B. Gerrard, supra note 21, at 17. R
185. See id. at 5.
186. Id.
187. Id. at 8–9.
188. La. Generating LLC v. Ill. Union Ins. Co., 831 F.3d 618, 630 (5th Cir. 2016).
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donation terms in federal government settlements unless they “provide restitu-
tion for or otherwise remedy the actual harm (including to the environment)
directly and proximately caused by the alleged conduct of the party, that is the
basis for the settlement agreement.”189 In addition, the Trump Administration’s
2017 guidance mirrors the Slush Funds Act.190 The 2017 guidance prohibits
DOJ attorneys from entering “into any agreement on behalf of the United
States in settlement of federal claims or charges, including agreements settling
civil litigation . . . that directs or provides for a payment or loan to any non-
governmental person or entity that is not a party to the dispute.”191 The 2017
guidance further provides that “the policy does not apply to an otherwise lawful
payment or loan that provides restitution to victim or that otherwise directly
remedies the harm that is sought to be redressed, including, for example, harm
to the environment.”192 The 2017 guidance, later clarified in a 2018 guidance
specific to payments in environmental settlement agreements (“2018 guidance”)
further refined what a “direct” remedy means.193 The 2018 guidance specifies
that payments must go towards projects that reduce the same type of harm that
resulted from the unlawful conduct, at the source itself, or in the same airshed
as the source.194 The payment may not be out of proportion with the harm that
resulted from the unlawful conduct.195 In addition, if the harm is pervasive,
government attorneys must consider projects that reduce the harm in all
areas.196
The 2017 guidance, particularly in the aftermath of mitigation require-
ments in the Volkswagen partial consent decree, and the pending Slush Funds
Act, received significant attention in the news media.197 Environmental groups
expressed concern that the payment prohibition would effectively eliminate
critical environmental projects. In particular, states and environmental groups
expressed concern that the third-party payment ban could upend natural re-
source damage settlements like those achieved in the British Petroleum oil spill
settlement allowing $2.5 billion to be directed to the National Fish and Wild-
life Foundation, a congressionally chartered non-profit, to fund projects bene-
fiting natural resources on the gulf coast.198 At least one scholar commented
189. Stop Settlement Slush Funds Act of 2016, H.R. 5063, 114th Cong. (2016).
190. DOJ 2017 Guidance, supra note 7. R
191. Id.
192. Id.
193. DOJ 2018 Guidance, supra note 7. R
194. Id. at 3.
195. Id. at 4.
196. Id.
197. Tatiana Schlossberg & Hiroko Tabuchi, Settlements for Company Sins Can No Longer Aid
Other Projects, Sessions Says, N.Y. TIMES (June 9, 2017), https://perma.cc/S7EK-QK3J.
198. Suzanne Yohannan, DOJ Official Affirms NRD Deals’ Exemption from Third-Party Payments
Ban, INSIDE EPA (Mar. 19, 2018), https://perma.cc/UW76-BQ3H.
\\jciprod01\productn\H\HLE\44-1\HLE106.txt unknown Seq: 32  6-MAR-20 14:17
148 Harvard Environmental Law Review [Vol. 44
that such actions would prevent the government from addressing generalized
harm, and were not a necessary measure to address separation-of-powers con-
cerns.199 Industry attorneys worried that the ban would “upend industry’s ability
to enter settlement agreements because of concerns about how they pay for the
remedies they agree to.”200 As described below, such concerns eventually came
to fruition in the CAA Harley Davidson proposed consent decree.
B. Ramifications of New Guidance
In August 2016, the DOJ filed a complaint against Harley-Davidson, Inc.
(“Harley”), and simultaneously lodged a proposed consent decree with the
court, resolving violations of the CAA’s mobile source defeat device and tam-
pering provisions.201 The 2016 proposed consent decree included injunctive re-
lief provisions requiring Harley to include a complete ban on the sale of
“Tuning Products” that were not certified, deny and instruct dealers to deny
warranty claims where the dealer had any information that motorcycles were
tuned by tuning devices, and buy back any illegal tuners that remained in deal-
ers’ inventories.202 The 2016 proposed consent decree also included a mitigation
obligation: specifically, a requirement for defendants to pay a third-party organ-
ization $3 million to replace old woodstoves with emissions-certified
woodstoves.203
In November 2016, the Chairman of the House Committee on Oversight
and Government Reform inquired about the woodstove changeout “penalty.”204
The Chairman specifically asked for an opinion from the Government Ac-
countability Office (“GAO”) on whether “financial penalties like this run the
risk of creating the perception that the Justice Department and EPA may be
using this consent decree to augment their appropriations and circumvent the
appropriations process.”205 DOJ never moved to enter the proposed consent de-
199. Andrew Brady Spalding, Restorative Justice for Multinational Corporations, 76 OHIO ST. L.J.
357, 394–95 (2015) (saying such payments are “within the Executive’s legitimate enforce-
ment authority and [do] not run afoul of either Congress’s Article I power of the purse or
the MRA”); see also Stop Settlement Slush Funds Act of 2016: Hearing on H.R. 5063 Before the
Subcomm. on Regulatory Reform, Commercial and Antitrust Law of the H. Comm. on the Judici-
ary, 114th Cong. (2016) (testimony of David Min, Professor at U.C. Irvine School of Law).
200. Dawn Reeves, DOJ Allows Environmental Exceptions to Third-Party Settlement Payment Ban,
INSIDE EPA (Jan. 29, 2018), https://perma.cc/24CL-4CWY.
201. Harley Davidson Clean Air Act Settlement, EPA, https://perma.cc/HLF7-K4HU.
202. Id.
203. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Harley-Davidson to Stop Sales of Illegal Devices that
Increased Air Pollution from the Company’s Motorcycles (Aug. 18, 2016), https://perma.cc/
T83J-Z58B.
204. Letter from Jason Chaffetz, Chairman, H. Comm. on Oversight and Gov’t Reform, to Gene
L. Dodaro, Comptroller Gen. of the U.S. (Nov. 17, 2016), https://perma.cc/LC32-PPRS.
205. Id.
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cree. Instead, in July 2017, after the Trump Administration issued the 2017
Policy, DOJ filed a substitute consent decree identical to the originally pro-
posed consent decree, except without the mitigation obligation.206
In December 2017, DOJ moved to enter the new substitute consent de-
cree.207 In its motion, DOJ stated: “[T]he original consent decree would have
required defendants to pay a nongovernmental third-party organization to carry
out the mitigation project. Questions exist as to whether this mitigation project
is consistent with the new [June 5, 2017] policy.”208 In early 2018, several states
and one local government filed a motion in opposition to the court’s entry of
the substitute consent decree.209 Several environmental groups filed amici briefs
in support of the opposition. The core of the arguments by plaintiffs, defend-
ants, and opponents to the Harley substitute consent decree centered on
whether the substitute consent decree met the standard of “fair, reasonable, and
in the public interest” without the woodstove mitigation project.210
Harley, DOJ, and the State of Wyoming urged the court to approve the
substitute consent decree. Wyoming argued in public comment that while the
substitute consent decree should not have deleted the mitigation requirement,
the original consent decree did not go far enough to mitigate the harmful ef-
fects on Harley’s violations.211 Wyoming, in its comments on the Harley pro-
posed substitute consent decree, stated, “although the [Wyoming] Department
[of Environmental Quality] cannot yet quantify the extent of illegal emissions,
the agency knows that they have impacted and continue to impact Wyoming. It
also seems highly probable that subject defeat devices were sold and installed in
Wyoming.”212 Wyoming specifically referenced the Volkswagen partial consent
decree to argue that the Harley original consent decree only required Harley to
mitigate excess emissions in the New England area, and should have, like the
Volkswagen partial consent decree, included a nationwide effort to reduce excess
emissions.213
206. Notice of Lodging of Proposed Consent Decree Under the Clean Air Act, 82 Fed. Reg.
34,977 (July 27, 2017); see also David Shepardson, 10 U.S. States Object to EPA Reducing
Harley-Davidson Emissions Penalty, REUTERS (Feb. 1, 2018), https://perma.cc/9T2J-W4ZY.
207. United States Motion to Enter Consent Decree, United States v. Harley-Davidson, No.
1:16-cv-01687 (D.D.C. Dec. 11, 2017) [hereinafter U.S. Motion to Enter, Harley-David-
son]; Notice of Lodging of Proposed Consent Decree Under the Clean Air Act, 82 Fed.
Reg. at 34,977.
208. Notice of Lodging of Proposed Consent Decree Under the Clean Air Act, 82 Fed. Reg. at
34,978.
209. Shepardson, supra note 206. R
210. U.S. Motion to Enter, Harley-Davidson, supra note 207, ex. 2 at 7. R
211. Id. ex. 1-A at 3.
212. Id.
213. Id.
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Harley and DOJ focused arguments on uncertainty in quantifying the ex-
act amount of excess emissions in settlement of alleged CAA violations.214 Har-
ley argued that the case only alleged excess harm, nothing more.215 Since a court
did not adjudicate Harley’s defenses, there was no way to resolve whether there
was a violation at all, and certainly not whether an alleged violation caused
excess emissions.216 Harley also argued that that the injunctive relief require-
ments regarding the tuners were more than enough to account for any alleged
excess harm to the environment and public health.217 DOJ also noted uncer-
tainty regarding how the Court would ultimately analyze factors such as “the
amount of excess emissions the United States would be able to prove, and
whether a court would hold Harley-Davidson responsible for all of them, or
just a portion of them.”218 DOJ also argued that the woodstove project in the
proposed consent decree did not meet the requirements of the DOJ 2018 policy
for a limited exception for payments that directly remedy the harm, because it
did not adequately address emissions nationwide.219
Several environmental groups, and local and state governments, urged the
court to disapprove the substitute consent decree. The Sierra Club noted that
mitigation obligations need not remedy all of the alleged excess harm. Other-
wise, every project would fail to offset every particle of pollution stemming from
an environmental violation.220 Local and state governments argued that the sub-
stitute consent decree, without the mitigation project, could not be reasonable
because the federal government argued that the original consent decree with the
mitigation project was reasonable.221 At the time this Article was written, the
district court had not made a decision on approval of the Harley substitute
consent decree.
In addition, in September 2018 and January 2019, the federal government
announced two new CAA settlements with defendants on allegations of defeat
devices, Derive Systems, Inc. (“Derive”), and Fiat Chrysler Automobiles
(“FCA”).222 The Derive settlement, as noted by Sierra Club in its comment
during the public comment period, does not include requirements that defend-
214. U.S. Motion to Enter, Harley-Davidson, supra note 207, at 25. R
215. Response of Harley-Davidson to Amici Curiae at 2–3, United States v. Harley-Davidson,
No. 1:16-cv-01687 (D.D.C. Dec. 11, 2017).
216. Id.
217. Id. at 4–5.
218. U.S. Motion to Enter, Harley-Davidson, supra note 207, at 24–25. R
219. Id. at 29–30.
220. Id. at 18–31.
221. Id. ex. 1 at 50.
222. Derive Systems Clean Air Act Settlement, EPA (Sept. 24, 2018), https://perma.cc/G26D-
AH63; Fiat Chrysler Automobiles Clean Air Act Settlement Information Sheet, EPA (Jan. 10,
2019), https://perma.cc/HN3P-C8AQ.
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ants mitigate the air pollution impacts from the illegal devices.223 The FCA
settlement includes a payment for a project requiring the defendant to work
with third-party vendors of catalytic converters to improve the efficiency of
200,000 converters sold in the forty-seven states that do not already require the
use of the more stringent California-mandated catalysts.224 It remains to be seen
whether the inclusion of such payments for projects in the FCA settlement will
affect the court’s decision in approving the pending proposed settlements in
Harley. However, it is clear that regardless of the outcome in these case settle-
ments, multiple concerns over payments for projects in enforcement cases will
persist.225
V. MOVING FORWARD
This Part provides concrete suggestions on how agencies can work to re-
duce the criticism of payments for projects. First, it provides legislative ideas
that could create clear authority for payments for projects. Second, it argues
that agencies should try to clarify in settlement approval processes that such
projects serve a remedial purpose separate from a punitive purpose.
A. Legislative Role
New legislation could significantly reduce, if not alleviate, concerns that
payments for projects in enforcement cases violate notions of separation of
powers. Indeed, the Trump Administration agrees. In August 2019, in another
update to the 2017 and 2018 guidance, DOJ issued a memo restricting SEPs in
CWA cases with state and local governments as defendants.226 The memo spe-
cifically cites to SEPs as “miscellaneous-receipt-circumvention-devices” and as-
serts that SEPs challenge the congressional power of the purse.227 However, the
memo states that clear congressional intent can override any such concerns.228
223. Memorandum of Law in Support of the Motion of the United States of America to Enter
Consent Decree, ex. B at 2, United States v. Derive Systems, Inc., No. 1:18-cv-02201
(D.D.C. Feb. 5, 2019).
224. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, In Civil Settlements with the United States and California,
Fiat Chrysler Will Resolve Allegations of Cheating on Federal and State Vehicles Emissions Tests
(Jan. 10, 2019), https://perma.cc/UX44-JKMF; see Consent Decree at 101–04, United
States v. Fiat, No. 3:17-cv-3446-EMC (Jan. 10, 2019) (detailing the mitigation program).
225. See, e.g., Stephen Lee & Ellen M. Gilmer, Justice Department Ponders Nixing Environmental
Settlements Tool, BLOOMBERG L. (Oct. 30, 2019), https://perma.cc/4Y4U-Q4P7.
226. Memorandum from Jeffrey Bossert Clark, U.S. Assistant Att’y Gen., to Chiefs of All Re-
maining ENRD Sections, Using Supplemental Environmental Projects (“SEPs”) in Settle-
ments with State and Local Governments 8 (Aug. 21, 2019), https://perma.cc/XS3U-9BN6
[hereinafter DOJ 2019 Guidance].
227. Id.
228. Id.
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Moreover, the memo admits that a multitude of legal and policy arguments
support the use of SEPs—among them, bringing benefits to local communi-
ties.229 Indeed, without such payments, the impact to natural resources and
public health that often results from violations goes unaddressed. As such, new
legislation can provide a clear and balanced approach to addressing both the
need for payments for projects, and concerns that the Executive Branch could
overstep its authority.
Congress should enact new legislation so that agencies can specifically deal
with harm from specific violations. While all monies “received” by agencies
must be deposited into the U.S. Treasury for general appropriations, agencies
could be granted the statutory authority to retain monies received in enforce-
ment actions.230 Indeed, the NPS and USFS authorities described in Part III.C
of this Article are examples of such an exception to the MRA. In such situa-
tions, the MRA requirement to deposit such funds into the general fund of the
U.S. Treasury does not apply.231 As described by Professor Todd Peterson,
Congress in enacting the MRA sought to close a loophole that allowed execu-
tive branch agencies to unconstitutionally interfere with Congress’ appropria-
tions power.232 For example, after the British Petroleum (“BP”) oil spill,
Congress enacted the Resources and Ecosystems Sustainability, Tourist Op-
portunities, and Revived Economies of the Gulf Coast States Act (“RESTORE
Act”) establishing the Gulf Coast Restoration Trust Fund (“BP Trust”) in the
Treasury Department.233 The BP Trust includes eighty percent of all civil pen-
alties paid by BP after the date of the RESTORE Act for violations of the
CWA.234 The RESTORE Act then gives the Treasury Department the ability
to spend such civil penalties, without further appropriation, for certain eligible
activities, including providing grants for restoration projects in the Gulf Coast
region.235
Congress could provide authorization for agencies to spend monies re-
ceived in enforcement cases, for general categories of projects, in anticipation of
different types of violations. Congress has done so in discrete instances. For
example, in 2008, Congress enacted legislation amending the CAA and grant-
229. Id. at 12.
230. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO/OGC-92-13, PRINCIPLES OF FEDERAL AP-
PROPRIATIONS LAW 6-108 (1992) (“An agency may retain moneys it receives if it has statu-
tory authority to do so. In other words, 31 U.S.C. § 3302(b) will not apply if there is specific
statutory authority for the agency to retain the funds.”).
231. In re Availability of Receipts from Synthetic Fuels Projects for Contract Administration
Expenses of the Dep’t of Treasury, Office of Synthetic Fuels Projects, 72 Comp. Gen. 164,
165–66 (1993).
232. Peterson, supra note 28, at 334. R
233. Restore Act, U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, https://perma.cc/8L2B-WLXD.
234. Id.
235. Moving Ahead for Progress in the 21st Century Act, Pub. L. No. 112-141, §§ 1601–1608,
126 Stat. 405, 588 (2012).
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ing EPA authority to accept diesel-emissions reduction SEPs, creating an ex-
press exception to the prohibition on augmenting appropriations for diesel-
emission reduction projects.236 The legislative history of the provision indicates
that Congress wanted to clarify that the use of SEPs for diesel-emission reduc-
tion projects did not circumvent the MRA or ADA.237 Yet Congress would
need to provide multiple categories of acceptable SEPs across the CAA, CWA,
and other environmental statutes in order to provide a viable solution for reme-
dying harm to the public in all possible environmental enforcement cases.
Without new legislation, there is a strong chance that remedies for public
harms in enforcement cases will disappear, given the 2017, 2018, and 2019
DOJ guidance. The champions of these guidance documents have argued that
when the purpose of projects is to compensate for diffuse public harms, those
funds belong to the public.238 As a result, agencies should direct the funds into
the general treasury for Congress to spend on whatever it chooses.239 Indeed,
the DOJ 2019 guidance states: “Congress may also prefer to spend those funds
on, say, a new aircraft carrier or on ending the opioid epidemic.”240 Yet commu-
nities and natural resources impacted by violations, particularly violations that
are egregious or longstanding, deserve relief, and enforcement should at least
attempt to address those impacts.
Furthermore, the current Congressional appropriations process is simply
not conducive to ensuring that funds go towards remedies for generalized harm
from enforcement violations. Once funds are in the general treasury, communi-
ties and natural resources impacted by the underlying violation are unlikely to
see those funds go towards specific remedies. For example, instead of requiring
a defendant company to pay $3 million for woodstove replacements, EPA could
ask Congress for $3 million in its annual budget appropriation request to con-
duct woodstove replacements.241 Therefore, in the Harley case, for example, the
236. See Pub. L. No. 110-255, § 1, 122 Stat. 2423 (2008); see also EPA, 2015 UPDATED SEP
POLICY, supra note 68, at 2. R
237. S. REP. No. 110-266, at 2 (2008) (“Following Congressional action to fund the diesel re-
trofit program, EPA apparently has concluded that the Agency generally should cease fund-
ing diesel retrofit projects via SEPs. EPA believes that allowing diesel retrofits to be funded
by SEPs once Congress has specifically appropriated monies for that purpose could violate
the Miscellaneous Receipts Act. This legislation is intended to clarify that Congress did not
intend the funding of the Diesel Emissions Reduction Act to affect EPA’s ability to enter
into SEPs that fund diesel retrofit projects.”).
238. U.S. CHAMBER INST. FOR LEGAL REFORM, ENFORCEMENT SLUSH FUNDS: FUNDING
FEDERAL AND STATE AGENCIES WITH ENFORCEMENT PROCEEDS 18 (2015), https://per
ma.cc/97C8-DFHR.
239. Id.
240. DOJ 2019 Guidance, supra note 226, at 13. R
241. See, e.g., Stop Settlement Slush Funds Act of 2016: Hearing on H.R. 5063, supra note 4, at 56 R
(testimony of David M. Uhlmann, Director, Environmental Law and Policy Program, Uni-
versity of Michigan Law School) (“Professor UHLMANN: But what about the rest of us? I
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defendant would pay the $3 million to the U.S. Treasury, and later, EPA would
add a line-item request for $3 million for woodstoves, in its next legislative
budget request. However, there is no guarantee that EPA would actually re-
ceive the requested funds. Instead, the $3 million could easily be diverted to
another program, leaving the impacted community without compensation.
Theoretically, instead of EPA asking for funds for woodstove replace-
ments, communities affected by enforcement violations could lobby congres-
sional representatives. Under such a model, potential third parties, such as
states, local governments, and non-profit organizations would need to keep
track of individual enforcement actions and lobby the legislature for specific
funds for use on designated projects. Yet there are a multitude of competing
special interests that arise through lobbying efforts in the legislative process,
and it does not strain the imagination to think about how difficult it might be
for organizations to push for funds to remedy harm from a past enforcement
case. As a result, even though opponents assert that monetary penalties depos-
ited into the Treasury are better able to benefit society as a whole than pay-
ments directed to specific parties chosen by the defendant under guidelines
crafted by the federal government, the realities of the lobbying process suggest
otherwise.
Congressional legislation authorizing payments for projects would provide
clear benefits for payments for projects. Legislation would alleviate concerns
over the MRA. Legislation could also provide advocacy groups and local gov-
ernment agencies with advance notice of approved project ideas, providing ad-
vance direction to such groups and agencies on where to develop specific
projects for individual enforcement cases that may arise. Furthermore, legisla-
tion could also give agencies go-to project categories in instances where cases
resolve through last minute pre-trial settlements. Such legislation could amend
the key environmental statutes, such as the CAA and CWA, or the MRA.
B. Clarify Remedial Purpose
In the absence of legislative action, however, agencies should focus on
strengthening the remedial purpose of payments for projects in the enforcement
process. Specifically, agencies should work towards two goals. First, because so
many enforcement cases are resolved through settlement, agencies should look
towards better identification of specific harm from enforcement violations ear-
lier in the enforcement process. Second, agencies should better explain, in key
settlement documents, the connection between identified harm and payments
mean, Volkswagen’s conduct—you know, some news reports have suggested that hundreds
of people will die because of the nitrogen oxide that Volkswagen cars emitted into the envi-
ronment. How do we address that harm? Mr. MARINO: I don’t dispute that with you. But
I believe that’s Congress’ responsibility. . . . We’re going to go through the appropriation
process by which any department or agency requests money for its original budget.”).
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for projects, including the legal authority for courts to approve such payments.
Both these actions can help establish a clearer line between remedial and puni-
tive purpose.
1. Remedial Purpose Matters
Remedies are confusing, particularly because many remedies that seek to
serve distinct purposes have one form: money. Traditionally, monetary reme-
dies are legal in nature, and serve the purpose of compensation, or in the con-
text of civil enforcement, deterrence and punishment. Equitable remedies,
meanwhile, are typically actions taken by defendants, such as specific perform-
ance. Yet as evidenced by some of the cases discussed earlier in this Article,
equitable remedies can also take the form of money.
Separating when payments for projects serve a remedial versus punitive
purpose can reduce concerns about agency motivations to fund policy objec-
tives. Similar concerns over bias have arisen in the context of cy pres settle-
ments. For example, in the 2019 U.S. Supreme Court case Frank v. Gaos,242
some justices expressed concern about third-party organizations receiving pay-
ments as a substitute for victims of harm in cy pres settlements.243 While cy pres
is different from regulatory enforcement actions, the concerns associated with
involvement of third-party organizations are similar. In Frank, the Court issued
a holding based on standing of the plaintiffs, but in oral argument, the justices
repeatedly discussed concerns about third-party organizations receiving cy pres
funds.244 During the oral argument, Justice Alito questioned the likelihood that
the class members would support distributions to the named beneficiaries.245 In
addition, he asked: “So the parties and the lawyers get together and they choose
beneficiaries that they personally would like to subsidize? That’s how it
works?”246 Justices Sotomayor and Breyer also seemed to suggest that “full” cy
pres settlements, where all the funds go to a third-party organization, instead of
a more typical cy pres settlement where only some funds go to a third party,
deserve closer scrutiny.247
242. 139 S. Ct. 1041 (2019).
243. See id. at 1047 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
244. Ronald Mann, Argument Analysis: Judges Skeptical of “Cy Pres” Class-Action Settlements,
SCOTUSBLOG (Nov. 1, 2018), https://perma.cc/R8HZ-E8CD.
245. Transcript of Oral Argument at 13, Frank v. Gaos, 139 S. Ct. 1041 (Oct. 31, 2018) (No. 17-
961).
246. Id. at 14.
247. Id. at 46–47. For example, Justice Breyer also asked whether it would work if the Court
obligated lower courts to “scrutinize very carefully” full cy pres cases, stating that “what’s
happening in reality is the lawyers are getting paid and they’re making sometimes quite a lot
of money for really transferring money from the defendant to people who have nothing to do
with it.” Id.
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In addition, whether payments for projects are remedial versus punitive
affects the financial implications of such payments for defendants. In addition
to alleviating some of the confusion and controversy, a decision as to whether
payments in enforcement cases are legal or equitable in nature has significant
practical implications for defendants. For example, while payments for fines,
such as SEPs, have not been tax exempt, payments for projects that serve reme-
dial purposes are different.248 Indeed, the new 2018 tax law includes provisions
that could expressly allow tax deductions for projects that are associated with
restitution, like retrospective injunctive relief.249 In addition, as in the insurance
case after the Louisiana Generating CAA NSR settlement, insurance contracts
often cover damages or remediation.250 Thus, whether payments for projects in
enforcement cases qualify as either damages or remediation can affect a defen-
dant’s cost recovery of such payments.
Furthermore, whether payments are remedial versus punitive can help
keep such payments dedicated towards mitigation- or offset-oriented uses. For
example, the North Carolina Constitution requires that state-imposed penalties
go to fund public schools in the counties where the enforcement action associ-
ated with the penalties occurred.251 In a case heard by the North Carolina Su-
preme Court, local school board associations sought a declaratory judgment
that, among other things, the state Department of Environment and Natural
Resources (“DENR”), retained monies in violation of the state’s constitutional
provision.252 The DENR had attempted to retain monies collected as a SEP
from a company in violation of wastewater treatment standards.253 The DENR
argued that “although public education is a very important and sincere use of
these funds, the process returns very little to the environment which often suf-
fers as a result of these environmental violations.”254 The plaintiff school boards
argued that the specific SEP, water resources training, was not remedial in na-
ture, and as such, the money should have gone to schools.255 The court found in
favor of the school board, holding that “the money paid under the SEP did not
remediate the specific harm or damage caused by the violation even though a
248. See Tax Treatment of Supplemental (Beneficial) Environmental Projects, ALSTON & BIRD LLP
(Aug. 6, 2008), https://perma.cc/98W5-CBAY.
249. John R. Lehrer II et al., New Tax Law Will Shape Future Environmental Settlements,
BAKERHOSTETLER (Mar. 13, 2018), https://perma.cc/382J-CUN9.
250. La. Generating LLC v. Ill. Union Ins. Co., 719 F.3d 328, 335–37 (5th Cir. 2013) (holding
that insurance policy covered injunctive relief payments from CAA NSR settlement, exclu-
sion for civil penalties in the insurance policy did not apply).
251. N.C. Sch. Bd. Ass’n v. Moore, 614 S.E.2d 504, 508 (2005); see also CCH, INC., HAZARD-
OUS WASTE AND HAZARDOUS SUBSTANCE COMPLIANCE SEP FUNDS IN NORTH CARO-
LINA MUST GO TO PUBLIC SCHOOLS, P 23-6-3.08, 2015 WL 7375760.
252. Moore, 614 S.E.2d at 508–09.
253. Id. at 509.
254. Id. at 524–25.
255. Id. at 511.
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nexus may exist between the violation and the program at the community col-
lege to train waste water treatment employees.”256 Perhaps if there had been a
clearer remedial purpose, the court would have opined differently.
2. Identify Harm Early
The first step in defining a remedial purpose for payments for projects is to
identify the specific harm that the projects are designed to mitigate or offset.
Not all environmental enforcement cases present issues of harm. For example,
some enforcement cases may only allege recordkeeping violations. In such situ-
ations, defendants should fix the violation and pay a penalty for the violation to
deter future misconduct, but the remedy need not address past harm because
the violation itself does not cause harm to the environment or public health.
Other cases present issues of harm, but the specific nature of the harm is
unclear.
Unfortunately, identification of specific harm from enforcement violations
may not happen until late in the enforcement process. Practitioners often think
of hiring scientific and technical experts in anticipation of litigation, and typi-
cally engage experts in individual cases around the time of filing a complaint or
soon after.257 Furthermore, litigants often use research studies by experts to sup-
port arguments in civil discovery, motions practice, and at trial itself.258 Yet
many enforcement cases never get close to trial. Parties negotiating settlements
to resolve claims for injunctive relief through payments for projects, or to re-
ceive discounts on civil penalty through payments for projects, are often operat-
ing with little information about the specific harm from the alleged violation.
In order to affect settlement, identification of harms should happen earlier
in the enforcement process. Early identification can help to inform disputing
parties in the negotiation process for settlement. Information is useful for nego-
tiating parties when thinking through the quantity of excess pollution arising
from a violation, above relevant standards or requirements, and the impact of
such pollution. Information can also then help the negotiating parties select
payments for projects in settlement that are closely tailored to the identified
harm. Early identification and information may ultimately produce results that
are more effective for the environment.
256. Id. at 525.
257. Lawyers usually think of experts in the context of testifying or consulting experts. Testifying
experts provide expert opinions and reports in litigation, while consulting experts provide
general advice, for example, on the strengths and weaknesses of the litigation. See, e.g.,
Cynthia Bishop, Foraging Through the Jungle of Expert Discovery and Testimony, 22 NAT.
RESOURCES & ENV’T 3, 3 (2008).
258. For example, plaintiffs in Cinergy used the Harvard Six Cities Study in its proof of harm,
and one of the authors to the follow-up study, Joel Schwartz, testified at trial. See United
States v. Cinergy Corp., 618 F. Supp. 2d 942, 949 (S.D. Ind. 2009).
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In addition, early identification can help in the development of enforce-
ment as a whole, beyond individual enforcement cases. Agencies often an-
nounce environmental enforcement initiatives long before individual cases, and
even when there is no specific initiative, individual cases often breed additional
cases against similarly situated defendants. For example, a new National Emis-
sions Inventory (“NEI”) announced by EPA for 2017 to 2019 is targeting CAA
violations against the energy-extraction industry.259 In addition, while the
agency has not announced an NEI in the mobile source sector, it is evident that
post Volkswagen there will likely be a targeted rise in enforcement activity
against car manufacturing companies investigating potential additional cases in-
volving defeat devices.260 As a result, early identification of harm in one case can
affect understanding of harm, potential claims, and remedies from other similar
violations or similar defendant industries. In order to identify harm early in the
enforcement process, however, there needs to be an upfront investment in un-
derstanding relevant research, and consulting with scientific and technical
experts.
Government agencies should engage with experts at the beginning of en-
forcement initiatives to help in the development of enforcement theories, ideas,
and cases. Using experts and relevant research to identify broad-level public
harms associated with potential defendants can allow plaintiffs to understand
whether there may be harm to the public associated with violations early on,
before pursuing individual cases. For example, there are new research studies on
impacts from NOx to national parks and forests that could be useful in claims
of damage to federal lands from upcoming CAA cases. A recent peer-reviewed
study sampling NOx emissions in Grand Canyon National Park, for example,
found that roadside concentrations of NOx were significantly higher than con-
centrations thirty meters away.261 The study found that plants located near
roadsides in the park demonstrated higher levels of certain pollutants than the
same plants located farther from the roadside.262 In addition, scientists are iden-
tifying oil and gas wells as causing significant amounts of NOx emissions, par-
ticularly on a cumulative basis.263 While oil and gas shale basins are widely
259. National Compliance Initiative Ensuring Energy Extraction Activities Comply with Environ-
mental Laws, FY 2019 Update, EPA, https://perma.cc/2Q6L-TPF8.
260. Joel Mintz, Justice Delayed: Mercedes-Benz’s Diesel Pollution Remains Unprosecuted, CPR-
BLOG (Oct. 16, 2018), https://perma.cc/6PZJ-HT5K.
261. Julie A. Kenkel et al., Cars and Canyons: Understanding Roadside Impacts of Automobile Pollu-
tion in Grand Canyon National Park, 30 PARK SCI. 52, 54 (2013).
262. Id.
263. T.J. SULLIVAN & T.C. MCDONNELL, NAT’L PARK SERV., NATURAL RESOURCES TECH-
NICAL REPORT NPS/ARD/NRTR–2014/895, MAPPING OF NUTRIENT-NITROGEN CRITI-
CAL LOADS FOR SELECTED NATIONAL PARKS IN THE INTERMOUNTAIN WEST AND
GREAT LAKES REGIONS 4 (2014), https://perma.cc/Q8S9-S3FS (“Emissions of NOx from
an individual well, CAFO, or industrial source may be insignificant to the broader landscape.
However, the cumulative effects of many sources may be substantial.”).
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distributed across many parts of the United States, they tend to center around
particular regions with a high concentration of federal lands, including in North
Dakota, Utah, and Colorado.264 As a result, scientists have expressed concerns
that these areas may experience increased visibility and health problems, and
higher levels of acid deposition.265 These studies could be important for identi-
fying potential areas of harm from violations of the CAA coming from car
manufacturers, like Volkswagen, or oil and gas facilities.266
Investment in upfront research in enforcement can also help identify and
evaluate specific harm. For example, recent studies are demonstrating harm not
just to health and natural resources at national parks, but also to recreational
opportunities. Scientists have been able to evaluate NOx and ozone levels from
active monitors at several parks, including Mammoth Cave National Park in
Kentucky.267 When scientists there find, for example, that ozone levels exceed
health standards, or when they predict such exceedances, Mammoth Cave staff
post health advisories cautioning visitors of the potential health risks associated
with exposures to elevated levels.268 Research has shown that “air quality warn-
ings cause pollution avoidance behavior.”269 A July 2018 study that looked at
ozone warnings demonstrates considerable declines in visitation on days with
high levels of ozone in national parks.270 In fact, the study found that “from
1990 to 2014, average ozone concentrations in national parks were statistically
indistinguishable from the twenty largest U.S. metropolitan areas.”271 Further-
more, thirty-five percent of all national park visits occur when ozone levels are
unhealthy.272
Scientists too are often interested in looking for ways to make research
usable and applicable. Thus, better communication of federal agency enforce-
ment priorities for both CAA enforcement and NRD enforcement could be
264. Id.
265. See, e.g., Phil Taylor, Bakken Boom Linked to Haze at Theodore Roosevelt Park, E&E NEWS
(Nov. 7, 2013), https://perma.cc/3REF-XMBH (discussing the preliminary, unpublished
results of a study, attached to the article at https://perma.cc/TA6R-DWLM).
266. SULLIVAN & MCDONNELL, supra note 263, at 9. R
267. Park Air Profiles - Mammoth Cave National Park, NAT’L PARK SERV., https://perma.cc/
7GLE-SKVN.
268. See, e.g., Air Pollution Advisory, Mammoth Cave, NAT’L PARK SERV. (June 1, 2007), https://
perma.cc/C77W-DNSC; Park Air Profiles - Yosemite National Park, NAT’L PARK SERV.,
https://perma.cc/2HHE-P8MD. (“Ozone is a respiratory irritant, causing coughing, sinus
inflammation, chest pains, scratchy throat, lung damage, and reduced immune system func-
tions. Children, the elderly, people with existing health problems, and active adults are most
vulnerable.”).
269. David Keiser, Gabriel Lade & Ivan Rudik, Air Pollution and Visitation at U.S. National
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useful in helping produce science that is relevant for agencies to consider in
enforcement. EPA announces NEIs every few years through its website, and
law firms and news sources will often produce articles on EPA’s announce-
ment.273 While attorneys often read such announcements, it is doubtful that
they reach scientists in any meaningful way. Yet enforcement priority an-
nouncements send important information that is relevant to the scientific com-
munity. A focused scientific study on the impact of specific energy extraction
sources to nearby natural resources or communities, for example, could be valu-
able to plaintiff agencies as they begin to think through claims for damages to
federal lands from CAA violations in the mobile source or oil and gas sectors.
In addition, investment in scientific modeling early in the enforcement
process can also help with understanding harm that may be attributable to spe-
cific sources. In Cinergy, for example, plaintiffs’ atmospheric chemistry expert
used two models to identify the trajectory of specific excess emissions, and the
impact of such emissions on overall air pollution in the area.274 The models,
CMAQ and CAMx, essentially simulated the atmosphere over a community,
identifying all sources of NOx and Sulfur Dioxide (“SO2”) pollution, and then
“removed” the excess emissions from the plant to isolate its particular contribu-
tion.275 Using models like CMAQ and CAMx can be very expensive, and it is
not likely always practical to use these type of models to perform relevant analy-
ses in enforcement cases before the filing of a complaint or even before trial.
Yet cheaper or simpler forms of the same models are available and can be useful
to inform plaintiff agencies’ judgment on what to ask in an information request
to a potential defendant and whether to include a claim of damage in a notice
of violation, or to increase bargaining positions in settlement negotiations.276
Moreover, upfront investment in working with experts on research and
modeling is useful even if cases do not settle. Additional time and resources to
conduct modeling, far in advance of trial, may produce stronger evidence at trial
if an enforcement case proceeds that far. For example, the court’s weighing of
evidence on harm in Cinergy depended greatly upon the quality of the expert’s
information and analysis.277 In finding against plaintiffs on the element of irrep-
arable harm for acid rain deposition, the court in Cinergy specifically focused on
273. Todd S. Mikolop & Alexander Woo, Environmental Enforcement: Are There Any Trends?,
NICKEL REPORT (Dec. 14, 2018), https://perma.cc/RTB7-B98E; Jonathan S. Martel et al.,
EPA Signals More Enforcement Cases for Aftermarket Parks Manufacturers: Advisory, ARNOLD
& PORTER (Apr. 11, 2018), https://perma.cc/QS4T-42ER.
274. United States v. Cinergy Corp., 618 F. Supp. 2d 942, 951–53 (S.D. Ind. 2009).
275. Id. at 951.
276. See, e.g., CALPUFF Modeling System, EXPONENT ENG’G AND SCI. CONSULTING, https://
perma.cc/Y477-EE74.
277. Cinergy, 618 F. Supp. 2d at 964 (“With respect to Plaintiffs’ proof of acidic deposition
impacts and mercury impacts, the Court concludes that Plaintiffs did not provide sufficient
nexus between the relevant excess emissions and the negative environmental and health ef-
fects to support a conclusion of irreparable harm.”).
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the lack of air quality modeling.278 Specifically, the court stated: [expert witness
Dr.] “Driscoll purported to analyze the extent to which any measured acid dep-
osition was attributable to emissions from [plant at issue]. Despite having per-
formed environmental quality modeling in the past, Dr. Driscoll did not
perform such modeling for the emissions from the Wabash River plant.”279 Per-
haps if Dr. Driscoll had more time, he may have been able to perform the
helpful modeling.
Investment in identifying harm early in the enforcement process can also
lend well to identifying potential projects. As evidenced by the remedy trials in
Cinergy and Westvaco, remedies to help fix identified harm are not always easy
to find. Some scholars have proposed that in the SEP context, agencies or com-
munity groups should establish project banks so that there are identified op-
tions in anticipation of, rather than in reaction to, individual enforcement
cases.280 Projects proposed for banks should not only involve projects that com-
munity and environmental groups would like to see completed. Instead,
projects proposed for banks should identify, with the help of scientific experts,
the kinds of public health or natural resource harms that are potentially at issue
in a given sector targeted for enforcement. Indeed, the 2018 DOJ guidance
requires that payments must go towards projects that reduce the same type of
harm that resulted from the unlawful conduct, and that courts in litigation eval-
uate remediation proposals based in part on whether the proposal bears an eq-
uitable relationship to the degree and kind of wrong it is intended to remedy.281
Thus, projects that are able to quantify emission reductions of a given pollutant
are useful for plaintiffs to match with the quantity of excess emissions in a
particular enforcement case.282
3. Explain Projects
The second step in defining a remedial purpose for payments for projects
is to explain the purpose and use of any payments for projects to remedy such
harm. There are several enforcement settlement documents where agencies can
explain that payments indeed connect to identified harm, and that any third-
party organization recipients of payments are legitimate. EPA, for example,
uses a variety of documents in settlement beyond the publicly available judicial
consent decree itself, to convey both the purpose and use of payments so that
278. Id.
279. Id. at 954.
280. Simms, supra note 2, at 10,526 (suggesting outreach on project ideas in advance of initiating R
geographically focused or industry-specific enforcement initiatives).
281. DOJ 2018 Guidance, supra note 7, at 2–3. R
282. Markell, supra note 116, at 562 (noting that the Science Advisory Board has suggested quan- R
tification or monetization of harm from violations, when present, in order to produce opti-
mal civil penalties).
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the public, other potential plaintiffs such as states and citizen groups, legisla-
tors, and courts understand the connections between payments and projects.283
For example, in October 2018, the government settled violations of the CAA
against Chevron USA for allegedly failing to implement a risk management
program for the potential release of hydrogen sulfide, a regulated HAP, and
failing to notify surrounding communities of any releases.284 The settlement
included a SEP that required the defendant to spend $10 million on supplying
emergency response equipment to local jurisdictions surrounding the five vio-
lating refineries in approximate proportion to the extent of the alleged viola-
tions at each refinery.285 EPA stated in its settlement information sheet that
“these SEPs will enhance the capabilities of emergency responders located near
the refineries and will facilitate quick and efficient response to releases associ-
ated with emergency events.”286
Motions to enter proposed consent decrees are also particularly useful for
conveying information about payments to remedy harm. To be sure, some
scholars argue that the fairness standard courts use to review judicial consent
decrees often results in a mere rubber stamp by judges, and that the merits of
settlements lack meaningful judicial review.287 Professors Andrew Morriss,
Bruce Yandle, and Andrew Dorchak, for example, argue that the traditional
notice and comment rulemaking process provides more significant opportuni-
ties for public participation than a settlement approval process.288 Yet if interest
groups participated more in the settlement approval process, perhaps the trans-
parency and public participation concerns could be mitigated. That is, similar
benefits from rulemaking, such as open public comment periods, and holding
agencies responsible for addressing public comments, can and do exist in settle-
ment approval as well. Public comments may not change an agency’s proposed
consent decree or alter a court’s decision to approve the decree. However, in the
rulemaking process too, agencies do not have to adhere to commenters’ con-
cerns, and courts tend to afford agencies substantial deference.289
283. See, e.g., Coal-Fired Power Plant Enforcement, EPA, https://perma.cc/X9KU-YMJW (pro-
viding information sheets, press releases, and other documents for settlements).
284. Consent Decree at 2, United States v. Chevron USA, No. 4:18-cv-06506 (N.D. Cal. Oct.
24, 2018).
285. Chevron Settlement Information Sheet, EPA, https://perma.cc/N56X-M823.
286. Id.
287. See, e.g., Adam Zimmerman, Distributing Justice, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 500, 550 (2011)
(“[M]any agency settlements lack meaningful judicial review. In most cases, federal courts
review settlement plans with great deference to agency discretion.”); see generally W. Hamil-
ton Jordan, Calibrating Judicial Scrutiny of Agency Enforcement Decrees, 34 YALE L. & POL’Y
REV. 57 (2015).
288. Morriss, et al., supra note 6, at 182–83. R
289. See, e.g., Ohio Valley Envtl. Coal. v. Hurst, 604 F. Supp. 2d 860, 880–82 (S.D. W. Va. 2009)
(describing how and when agencies must respond to public comment).
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Even if agencies ignore comments or judges short-change review, motions
for entry of judicial consent decrees are important for communication. The mo-
tion, comment process, and approval hearing are opportunities to convey infor-
mation on legal authority, scientific basis, and goals of settlement terms,
including payments for projects. For example, in the 2016 Tractor Supply com-
ment period, an individual citizen argued that the proposed CAA enforcement
consent decree did not include enough woodstove changeouts to offset the
amount of excess emissions from the defendant’s violation involving small
nonroad engines and motorcycles.290 The government’s motion to enter in-
cluded a detailed response to the citizen’s comment.291 The motion included a
declaration from an EPA engineer that described how EPA, in the absence of
direct evidence regarding the extent of excess emissions, used assumed uncon-
trolled emission rates published in the underlying regulation’s impact analysis
for nonroad engines and motorcycles to calculate rough excess emissions.292 The
declaration was then able to explain that the commenter had used incorrect
assumptions regarding the burn rate and lifespan of woodstoves.293 Such expla-
nation and communication may help diffuse concerns by commenters.
Additionally, in the 2003 Alcoa comment period, local county commis-
sioners in Texas commented that the acquisition of lands for protecting the
Houston toad was “not even remotely related to air quality” and that the citi-
zens of the local counties should have had the chance to weigh in on the pro-
posed projects before the lodging of the consent decree.294 The government, in
its motion to enter, was able to provide a detailed response to the commission-
ers, explaining that “setting aside property and habitat that needs to recover
from years of enormous power plant emissions, this [project] will keep addi-
tional air emissions from harming these same lands with pollution from devel-
opment.”295 Further, the motion explained that although the third-party
organization receiving the funds was a national-level organization, the proposed
consent decree required that a local land trust would make the actual determi-
nation on spending of the funds. Once again, such explanation and communi-
cation, if it can diffuse concerns by commenters, may provide a stronger basis
for judges to understand the remedial purpose and enter a proposed consent
decree.
290. See Unopposed Motion to Enter Consent Decree and Response to Public Comments at 19,
United States v. Tractor Supply Co., No. 1:15-cv-01589 (D.D.C. Jan. 17, 2016).
291. Id. at 21–22.
292. Id. at attach. C ¶¶ 9–12.
293. Id. at attach. C ¶¶ 12, 14–17.
294. United States’ Motion to Enter Consent Decree, attach. A, United States v. Alcoa, Nos. a-
01-CA-881-SS and A-03-CA-222-SS (W.D. Tex. July 11, 2003).
295. United States’ Motion to Enter Consent Decree at 23, United States v. Alcoa, Nos. a-01-
CA-881-SS and A-03-CA-222-SS (W.D. Tex. July 11, 2003).
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Clarification of consent decree provisions is also important in the motion-
to-enter process, particularly given the preclusion effect of judicial consent de-
crees. For example, the government’s motion to enter the Volkswagen partial
consent decree specifically pointed out that “once the Trust is established, those
same governmental entities may apply to become Beneficiaries of the Trust by
making certain certifications to the Court, including a waiver of injunctive
claims for mitigation arising from the 2.0 liter vehicles.”296 In Harley, however,
the government’s motion to enter does not describe why the revised proposed
consent decree includes a release for all claims in the complaint, even with no
payment from the defendant to remedy the alleged harm.297 That is, although
the Harley complaint alleged that the defendant had sold illegal motorcycle
tuners that caused bikes to emit higher amounts of NOx than allowed by EPA
emissions standards, the proposed revised consent decree resolves such allega-
tions with no payment for a project to remedy the alleged excess NOx.298 A
court order entering the revised proposed consent decree could then preclude
Wyoming, or any other potential plaintiff, from pursuing a claim for retrospec-
tive injunctive relief on their own.299 Thus, a critically lacking element of the
government’s motion to enter the revised proposed consent decree in Harley
helps explain why the decree resolved all claims for injunctive relief.
C. Inter-Agency Workgroup
In addition to clarifying remedial purpose in individual enforcement mat-
ters, federal agencies should also work together to discuss best practices in pay-
ments for projects in settlements. Agencies often establish formal working
relationships to work on areas with overlapping substantive interests but diver-
gent expertise. When EPA issued the proposed Utility Mercury Air Toxics
Standard (“Utility MATS”), public comments revealed concerns over electricity
reliability, an area within the expertise of energy agencies.300 As a result, EPA
and FERC issued enforcement guidance that described a collaborative review
process of potential non-compliance with the Utility MATS associated with
296. See United States Motion to Enter, In re Volkswagen, supra note 106, at 17. R
297. United States Motion to Enter, Harley-Davidson, supra note 207, ex. 1-A at 4–5. R
298. Id.
299. See, e.g., State Water Control Bd. v. Smithfield Foods, Inc., 542 S.E.2d 766 (Va. 2001). In
Smithfield, the Virginia State Water Control Board (“VSWCB”) brought an enforcement
action against Smithfield for violations of a permit issued pursuant to the CWA. Id. at 767.
The VSWCB initiated its action following the initiation of an ultimately successful adjudi-
cation by EPA before the Fourth Circuit for violations of the same permit. Id. at 768. The
court dismissed VSWCB’s action on res judicata grounds. Id. at 771.
300. James E. McCarthy, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., EPA’S UTILITY MACT: WILL THE
LIGHTS GO OUT 10–11 (Jan. 9, 2012), https://perma.cc/EL5C-K5RT.
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needs for electricity.301 Similarly, after amendments to the Energy Policy Act in
2005 required coordination of environmental reviews to site electric transmis-
sion lines, several agencies responsible for federal lands and siting entered into a
memorandum of understanding to establish a framework for cooperation.302 In
addition, to help with related retail fraud claims, the Bureau of Consumer Fi-
nancial Protection and the Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) es-
tablished a task force, with DOJ, to “facilitate inter-agency cooperation in
deterring and prosecuting consumer fraud crimes.”303 Remedial purpose and
payments for projects in civil enforcement settlements is another area that could
benefit from cross-agency coordination and continual working relationships.
Numerous agencies enforce violations of statutes that involve harm to the
public. Importantly, many of the relevant statutes are similar. For example, the
Federal Trade Commission Act (“FTC Act”) allows the FTC to seek a court
order requiring civil penalties and injunctive relief from individuals and compa-
nies alleged to have engaged in deceptive or unfair practices.304 The Fair Hous-
ing Act includes authority for courts to issue a civil penalty and to award such
other relief as the court deems appropriate.”305 The Sarbanes-Oxley Act, en-
forced by the SEC, also includes authority for courts to issue a civil penalty and
injunctive relief, as well as any equitable relief that may be appropriate.306 The
similarity of enforcement authorities begs for inter-agency discussion on how
301. Staff White Paper on the Commission’s Role Regarding Environmental Protection Agency’s Mer-
cury and Air Toxics Standards, FERC (Jan. 30, 2012), https://perma.cc/M6WZ-NBCV; En-
forcement Response Policy: Mercury and Air Toxics Standard (MATS), EPA, https://perma.cc/
LL8H-YHP9.
302. U.S. Dep’t of Energy et al., Memorandum of Understanding on Early Coordination of Fed-
eral Authorizations and Related Environmental Reviews Required in Order to Site Electric
Transmission Facilities (2006), https://perma.cc/FFT8-23KN.
303. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Department of Justice, Bureau of Consumer Financial
Protection, U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, Federal Trade Commission An-
nounce Task Force on Market Integrity and Consumer Fraud (July 11, 2018), https://perma
.cc/HR2E-HLWM.
304. 15 U.S.C. § 53(b) (2018); see also A Brief Overview of the Federal Trade Commission’s Investi-
gative, Law Enforcement, and Rulemaking Authority, FED. TRADE COMM’N (July 2008),
https://perma.cc/FU6D-GT73.
305. 42 U.S.C. § 3614(d)(1)(B) (2018). Note that the Fair Housing Act enforcement provisions
also allow courts to “award such preventive relief, including a permanent or temporary in-
junction, restraining order, or other order.” Id. § 3614(d)(1)(A).
306. The Sarbanes-Oxley Act amended the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the “Exchange
Act”), which has civil penalty and injunctive relief authority to enforce federal securities laws.
In 1970, the SEC succeeded in convincing a federal district court to permit the remedy of
disgorgement under the premise that the SEC had the “inherent equity power to grant relief
ancillary to an injunction.” In 2002, Congress amended the Exchange Act through the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act to say that “the Commission may seek, and any federal court may grant,
any equitable relief that may be appropriate or necessary for the benefit of investors.” The
government continued to seek disgorgement, citing the Sarbanes-Oxley Act as statutory au-
thority for ordering the remedy. See generally Jacqueline Chang, Kokesh v. SEC: The Demise
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courts interpret the authorities, and potential application to monetary remedies
that seek to address past harm from violations.
In some enforcement cases, like those under the CAA, the harm to the
public is widespread. For example, as part of the banking mortgage crisis, vari-
ous federal agencies—including the Federal Housing Administration (“FHA”),
the SEC, and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation—settled multiple
claims with banks, such as Bank of America.307 Bank of America conceded that
it originated risky mortgage loans and made misrepresentations about the qual-
ity of those loans to Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, and the FHA.308 Bank of
America’s settlement included a requirement that the bank provide $7 billion in
“consumer relief.”309 The consent decree allowed part of the consumer relief
payment to be in the form of monies paid to legal aid and housing counseling
organizations to assist individuals with foreclosure prevention, and to support
community reinvestment and neighborhood stabilization and provide financing
for affordable rental housing with a focus on family housing in high-cost ar-
eas.310 Many experts have discussed the relationship between neighborhood
blight, the mortgage-housing crisis, and the need for housing services.311 Yet
the relevant agency settlement documents, such as settlement information
sheets, and motions to enter proposed settlement, often do little to discuss the
connections.
Even in statutory enforcement cases involving identifiable victims, agen-
cies are grappling with how to define remedial payments in settlement docu-
ments. The SEC, for example, seeks to return illegal profits to defrauded
of Disgorgement, 22 N.C. BANKING INST. 309 (2018) (quoting Securities and Exchange
Com’n v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 312 F. Supp. 77, 91 (S.D.N.Y. 1970)).
307. Note too, prior to the Obama Administration, the federal government settled similar claims.
For example, in an FHA settlement involving the owners of a Florida apartment complex,
the federal government alleged that the complex charged African-American residents higher
rents than it charged white residents, and that prospective black tenants were falsely in-
formed that there were no apartments available for rent. As part of the settlement, the apart-
ment owners agreed, among many other things, to make payments to a third-party
organization, Housing Opportunities Project for Excellence, for future testing of discrimina-
tion. See, e.g., Christopher C. Sabis, Executing the Laws or Executing an Agenda: Usurping of
Statutory and Constitutional Rights by the Department of Justice, 37 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM
257, 260 (2003).
308. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Bank of America to Pay $16.65 Billion in Historic
Justice Department Settlement for Financial Fraud Leading Up to and During the Financial
Crisis (Aug. 21, 2014), https://perma.cc/3SQR-P6RW.
309. Id.
310. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Summary of $7 Billion in Consumer Relief Provided by
Justice Department Settlement with Bank of America, https://perma.cc/3JH9-LW9S.
311. See generally ERWIN DE LEON & JOSEPH SCHILLING, URBAN INST., URBAN BLIGHT AND
PUBLIC HEALTH (2017), https://perma.cc/AV82-8Y65; Kermit Lind & Joe Schilling, Abat-
ing Neighborhood Blight with Collaborative Policy Networks—Where Have We Been? Where Are
We Going?, 46 U. MEM. L. REV. 803 (2016).
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investors as part of “disgorgement.”312 The FTC seeks to return illegal profits to
harmed consumers as part of “restitution.”313 When no individual is entitled to
the funds or individuals harmed are too dispersed for feasible identification or
payment, however, disgorgement or restitution funds go to the U.S. Trea-
sury.314 In the 2017 case Kokesh v. SEC,315 the Supreme Court found that “dis-
gorgement” in the SEC enforcement settlement was not “remedial” but instead
“punitive.” While the case was primarily about the statute of limitations, the
key takeaway for purposes of this article was that the agency had attempted to
define disgorgement as remedial.316 The Court acknowledged that payments in
enforcement settlements could serve more than one purpose. The Court, how-
ever, found that because the purpose of disgorgement was not to compensate a
violation committed against an aggrieved individual, but instead served a puni-
tive and deterrence purpose for a violation committed against the United States,
it was a penalty.317
Greater inter-agency dialogue on enforcement and payment for projects
can help agencies work together to advance remedial goals in settlement. To be
sure, inter-agency coordination is likely extremely resource-intensive. However,
synergies already exist across agencies in non-enforcement programs, and as a
result, moving to prioritize inter-agency dialogue on enforcement matters
should not be a great leap.318 It may be helpful for agencies to connect with each
other on relevant research and experts for identifying harm. For example, the
NPS and USFS have several air pollution scientists on staff that could provide
312. Steven Peikin, Co-Dir., SEC Div. of Enforcement, Remedies and Relief in SEC Enforcement
Actions, SEC (Oct. 3, 2018), https://perma.cc/9DSW-VMFN.
313. The FTC has argued that the statutory reference to “permanent injunction” entitles it to
obtain an order not only permanently barring deceptive practices, but also imposing various
kinds of monetary equitable relief (i.e., restitution and rescission of contracts) to remedy past
violations. See A Brief Overview of the Federal Trade Commission’s Investigative, Law Enforce-
ment and Rulemaking Authority, supra note 304. R
314. See Kokesh v. SEC, 137 S. Ct. 1635, 1644 (2017) (citing SEC v. Fischbach Corp., 133 F.3d
170, 171 (2d Cir. 1997)).
315. Id.
316. Id. As discussed by the Supreme Court in Kokesh, the SEC argued that disgorgement is not a
civil penalty, but is instead “remedial” in that it “lessen[s] the effects of a violation” by
“restor[ing] the status quo.” Similar to arguments in CAA enforcement cases, the SEC ar-
gued that disgorgement comes from a court’s inherent equity power to grant relief “ancillary”
to an injunction, intending to add to or supplement the principal relief of an injunction
barring future violations of securities laws.
317. The Sarbanes-Oxley Act, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (2002), gave the SEC author-
ity to distribute funds gained as disgorgement through the Fair Funds Act. However, the
Supreme Court in Kokesh found that the SEC often did not distribute disgorgement funds to
victims through the compensation process. See Kokesh, 137 S. Ct. at 1638.
318. See Veronica Root, Coordinating Compliance Incentives, 102 CORNELL L. REV. 1003, 1010
(2017) (noting that enforcement actions focus on compliance with a particular set of laws,
that is, they are piecemeal).
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expertise, early in a CAA enforcement case or NEI that involves acidic pollu-
tants. Regulatory agencies often live in silos most typically based on substantive
practice areas and statutory enforcement authorities. Yet separate statutes, such
as the CAA and the PSRPA, relate to each other, particularly in attempts to
achieve the goals of public protection envisioned by the statutes themselves.
CONCLUSION
Payments for projects, as a product of both civil penalty and injunctive
relief authorities, have attempted to address past harm from enforcement viola-
tions. This Article concludes that both authorities allow for such payments, but
that many relevant players in enforcement settlements, including defendants,
courts, the public, and the legislature most readily accept such payments when
they serve a clear remedial purpose. As a result, Congress should consider
adopting legislation that provides clear authority for payments for projects. In
addition, agencies should work towards better identifying the kind of harm that
may result from an enforcement violation, and developing an explanation of
how requirements for payments for projects are an effective remedy for the
harm.
* * *
